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1.0 INTRODUCTION
----------------------------------------------------
The results of a study to assess the Tug safing requirements at
postlanding are presented in this addendum. The study considered
the normal (green light) conditions from Orbiter landing to com-
pletion of preparations for the next launch. Normal Tug ground
turnaround operations include handling and transportation activ-
ities and the performance of inspections, tests, and checkout
functions. These activities dictate that hazards to ground per-
sonnel, the Tug, GSE, facilities, and ecology be reduced to the
lowest practical level consistent with program objectives, cost,
and schedules.
During flight operations, the Tug contains energy sources that
constitute potential hazards but are required for mission accom-
plishment. These potential hazards have been reduced to an ac-
ceptable level for flight operation by design features (safety
factors, etc) and by providing for control of energy sources.
The Tug safing philosophy, however, must be to eliminate each
energy source as soon as practical after the requirement for
that energy is fulfilled. Residual energy sources (hazards) must
remain under monitor and control. Tug safing, therefore, is
actually accomplished incrementally during recovery, reentry, and
postlanding operations.
Actions necessary to comply with Tug safing requirements at post-
landing are dependent upon the Tug systems status at the time of
Orbiter landing. For the purposes of this study, assumptions
were made concerning residual hazards present at landing, because
Tug safing requirements for retrieval and reentry are the subject
of a concurrent study. Based on these assumptions, requirements
and actions were developed to reduce the hazard level of the re-
turned Tug to an acceptable level to permit personnel access to
accomplish turnaround activities.
2.0 STUDY GROUND RULES AND ASSUMPTIONS
---------------------------------------------------
2.1 GROUND RULES
Ground rules for assessment of Tug safing requirements at post-
landing follow:
1) Normal baseline functional flow developed in Task 1.0 shall
be followed for this study.
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2) For normal turnaround operations, hazard levels must be re-
duced to a level acceptable for personnel access and perfor-
mance of required activities. It is considered neither essen-
tial nor practical to achieve an absolute safe (completely
inert) Tug status.
3) Postlanding safing requirements and actions shall be con-
sidered in two phases: (a) the ground operations with the
Tug in the Orbiter payload bay, and (b) operations after the
Tug has been removed from the Orbiter.
2.2 ASSUMPTIONS
Certain assumptions were required to establish a baseline for this
study. Safing to the Tug actually begins upon completion of the
primary mission of delivery/retrieval of payloads, and progresses
incrementally into the ground turnaround operations. Because the
postlanding safing requirements are dependent on conditions at
landing, assumptions were established concerning prelanding saf-
ing actions and the residual potential hazards on landing.
These assumptions follow:
1) Prelanding Safing Actions
a) Main propellant residual liquids are expelled before re-
trieval.
b) The Auxiliary Propulsion System (APS) is secured during
retrieval operations.
c) Tug/Orbiter interfaces are reestablished and verified on
retrieval.
d) Tug electrical power requirements are provided by the
Orbiter after retrieval.
e) Fuel cell residual reactants are expelled through the
Orbiter interfaces.
f) All pressurized tanks and systems are adjusted to nominal
levels for reentry.
2) Residual Potential Hazards
a) Chemical energy in the form of residual hydrogen vapor
and hydrazine will be present. Liquid hydrogen residuals
will have been expelled from the main propellant and fuel
cell reactant tanks, but some residual vapor will remain.
The APS will be secured by closing the series redundant
thruster valves with residual hydrazine in the tank and
lines.
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b) Pressure energy will be present in the main propellant
tanks, fuel cell reactant tanks, and pressurization systems.
The main propellant and fuel cell tanks will be pres-
surized to preclude implosion during landing. The pres-
surization systems will contain residual pressurants.
These pressures will vary as a function of temperature
changes during and after landing.
c) The partially discharged auxiliary (flight) battery pre-
sents an electrical energy source.
d) Since no ordnance devices have been identified in the
baseline configuration, safing requirements for ordnance
systems have been excluded from consideration at this
time.
3.0 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
In accordance with study ground rules, safing requirements at
postlanding were developed for the following two phases of ground
operations.
3.1 ORBITER/TUG OPERATIONS
The safing requirements during Orbiter/Tug (Tug in Orbiter pay-
load bay) operations may be discussed in three functional areas.
1) Since the Orbiter flight crew has prime responsibility to
monitor and control safety-critical Tug functions, they shall
make a final check before egress to ensure all Caution and
Warning (C&W) parameters are within limits. The flight crew
shall also initiate and verify transfer of control of Tug
functions to Ground Control crews.
2) Tug Ground Control shall monitor the C&W parameters with
particular attention to tank pressure levels during postland-
ing temperature variations. In the course of monitoring tank
pressures and temperatures, Ground Control shall verify the
pressure integrity of all tanks (in the gross terms available)
with flight instrumentation.
3) The Orbiter Ground Operations crew shall establish the pay-
load bay purge to neutralize any hazardous vapors. The ex-
haust from the payload bay purge shall be subjected to haz-
ardous vapor detectors to ensure freedom from leaks. In the
event the hydrogen tanks require venting, the Tug H2 vent
shall be connected to a burn stack through Orbiter interfaces.
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Compliance with these requirements will provide confidence that
the Tug may be removed from the Orbiter payload bay and transported
to the TPF safely.
3.2 TUG TURNAROUND OPERATIONS
Tug safing for turnLarouInd Ueraions is completed after removal
from the Orbiter payload bay and transport to the TPF.
Four requirements reduce hazards to an acceptable level for turn-
around activities.
1) The APS tanks and lines shall be drained of residual liquid
hydrazine. The system shall then be purged and sealed with a
dry nitrogen blanket.
2) The auxiliary (flight) battery shall be disconnected and re-
moved from the Tug.
3) All Tug pressurized systems shall be leak checked with helium
at maximum operating pressure to verify all systems' integrity.
Upon completion of the leak check, each system shall be vented
to a pressure of one-fourth or less of the design burst pres-
sure and sealed. Hydrogen systems shall be vented to a burn
stack for disposal of any residual hydrogen vapor during this
operation. This reduced blanket pressure will remain in the
tanks during the remainder of the processing flows.
4) Pressure systems shall be monitored by LPS during turnaround
activities to ensure that pressure levels remain in limits.
Continuous monitoring is not required because pressure changes
are a function of temperature change and the Tug is in a con-
trolled environment during turnaround. A temperature change
of 30*F would produce a pressure change in the order of 1.0
psia on the largest (hydrogen) tank.
4.0 DISCUSSION
------------------------------------------------------------------
Detailed assessments of each identified Tug postlanding potential
hazard follow:
4.1 CHEMICAL ENERGY
The two sources of potentially hazardous chemical energy present
are hydrazine and hydrogen.
4.1.1 Hydrazine
The major chemical energy source remaining onboard the Tug at
landing will be the residual hydrazine liquid in the APS tanks
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and lines. Hydrazine, N2H4, is a stable liquid when confined in
a system. It is not sensitive to shock, friction, or temperature
extremes below 320 0F. Hydrazine vapor is toxic (threshold limit
value of 1 ppm) and flammable (or explosure) at concentrations
above 4.7% by volume.
The APS system will be in a sealed condition with series redundant
thruster valves closed during reentry and landing. Because leaks
could develop from stresses imposed at landing, a nitrogen purge
of the payload bay and hydrazine vapor detection should be ini-
tiated upon arrival at the OPF. Absence of hydrazine vapor will
indicate that the APS is safe for Tug removal and transport to
the TPF airlock. The liquid hydrazine may then be removed, using
protective clothing for fuel handlers, and the system purged with
dry nitrogen. The system can then be sealed with a nitrogen
blanket and then proceed through the turnaround cycle with an ac-
ceptable hazard level.
4.1.2 Hydrogen
It has been assumed that the liquid hydrogen (LH2 ) has been re-
moved from the main propellant tank and the fuel cell reactant tank
before reentry, but a relatively high concentration of H2 vapor
remains. This assumption is based on a previous study which shows
that, when the LH2 is dumped, the tank pressure would be bled to<
2.0 psia (well above the triple point pressure of 1.0 psia for
hydrogen), which should preclude the formation of H2 ice in the
tank. H2 vapor is not toxic but is highly flammable in concen-
trations above 4% by volume in air. Vapors within the flammabil-
ity limits can be ignited with very low energy, including self-
generated static electricity, and present explosion hazards when
partially confined.
The systems will be sealed before reentry, but leaks could develop
during landing. A nitrogen purge of the payload bay and hydrogen
vapor detection should therefore be established upon arrival at
the OPF. During the Orbiter/Tug ground operations, Tug Ground
Control will monitor tank pressures and perform a pressure in-
tegrity check (in the gross terms available) with flight instru-
mentation. Absence of hydrogen vapor and a successful integrity
check will provide confidence that the hydrogen systems are safe
for Tug removal and transport to the TPF airlock. All pressure
systems will be leak checked at operating pressure in the TPF,
which will verify system integrity. The system will then
be vented to a safe level, as discussed in paragraph 3.2,
and sealed for the remaining turnaround activities. The venting
of the H2 system must be through a burn stack because the vented
gases may be above the lower flammability limit. The hydrogen
vapor sealed in the pressure tight system is considered an accept-
able hazard level with minimum impact on turnaround timelines
and purge commodity costs, especially helium.
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4.2 PRESSURE ENERGY
Tug pressurization systems will contain residual pressurants, and
propellant/fuel cell reactant tanks will be pressurized at land-
ing. These pressures can be controlled by venting or adding pres-
sure to the propellant/fuel cell reactant tanks, as required. The
propellant/reactant tanks pressure level will be sufficient to
preclude implosion during reentry and landing. Pressure levels
in all systems will vary as a function of temperature changes dur-
ing the landing and postlanding period and must be maintained within
design limits. Safety requirements at postlanding, then, are for
the Orbiter flight crew to monitor, verify that pressures are
within limits after landing, and ensure that control is transferred
to Tug Ground Control for continuation of the monitor/control func-
tion. After the postlanding cooldown is completed, tank pressure
will stabilize, and continuous monitoring is not required. Tem-
perature variations of 300 F will produce a pressure change of only
1.0 psia in the largest tank.
Before the Orbiter payload bay doors are opened, the Tug pressure
systems will be vented, if required, to provide safety factors of
2 from design burst levels. The Tug is then removed from the
Orbiter and transported to the TPF where a leak check at
operating pressure with helium is performed. Upon completion of
the leak check, all systems will be vented to provide safety fac-
tors of 4 from design burst. The pressure systems are then safe
for personnel access for the remainder of the turnaround activities.
4.3 ELECTRICAL ENERGY
The partially discharged Tug battery is also a potential hazard at
postlanding. Because the probability of a hazardous malfunction
is very low, the battery may be treated routinely in the TPF.
Disconnecting and removal of the battery will eliminate this po-
tential hazard from further consideration.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
--------------------- c---c--------------------------
The Tug and its spacecraft-to-Orbiter interface is of prime in-
terest and concern to ground operations analysis. For the Space
Transportation System (STS) to meet its objective of a cost ef-
fective system, the Tug design being considered must incorporate
definite constraints imposed by the Orbiter, while at the same
time the Orbiter must incorporate those interfaces required to
support a Tug and its payload. For the STS to meet this objective,
the Tug/Shuttle interface and its associated ground operational
impact should be periodically analyzed so that any design impact
may be incorporated into the systems as early as possible.
This special emphasis assessment is limited to the Tug/Shuttle
mating/demating functions and constraints of the total interface
concern. The assessment is based on the Tug-to-Shuttle physical
and functional interfaces as defined in the following documents:
Baseline Space Tug Requirements and Guidelines, MSFC 681400039-1
Baseline Space Tug Definition, MSFC 68M00039-2
Baseline Space Tug Ground Operations, Verification Analysis and
Processing, MSFC 68100039-4
Space Shuttle System Payload Accommodations, JSC 07700, Vol XIV,
Rev C
In addition to the above documentation, any pertinent information
generated during the assessment phase from the Program Development
Space Tug Task Team and/or MSFC will be factored into the analysis.
2.0 GROUND RULES/ASSUMPTIONS
2.1 GROUND RULES
Tug/Shuttle mating/demating functions were limited to those ac-
tivities performed before liftoff and after safing the Orbiter
on landing. The relative location of interfaces with respect to
the Orbiter are shown in Figure 2-1. All others were-considered
mission operations.
The interfaces considered were:
1) payload (Tug/Spacecraft/Adapter) installation;
2) payload removal;
3) T-0 launch umbilical panels;
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4) prelaunch umbilical panel;
5) payload retention system;
6) remote manipulator system;
7) aft flight deck payload operation equipment;
8) payload to aft bulkhead interface;
9) payload to forward bulkhead interface;
10) aft flight deck to aft bulkhead wiring;
11) payload primary power panel;
12) Tug tilt pivot attach point (Sta 1293).
Aft Flight Deck Checkout Equipment
P/L to Fwd Bulkhead Adapter
P/L Installation& Removal
S/C Tug
Primary Pwr Panel T-O Launch Umbilical Panels
Remote Manipulator System Aft Flight Deck to Aft Bulkhead
Prelaunch Umbilical Panel Wiring Harness
Retention System PIL to Aft Bulkhead
Tug Tilt Pivot & Attach Point
Figure 2-1 Payload Mate/Demate Interfaces
2.2 ASSUMPTIONS
1) A payload changeout room (PCR) with a payload manipulator
system, or equivalent, will be available for payload instal-
lation at the pad.
2) The PCR will be capable of maintaining a seal with the Orbiter
for a common environment.
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3) The PCR will contain access space to verify Tug-to-retention
system alignment during the mating function.
4) Access will be available at the aft bulkhead and adapter in-
terface area.
5) If the aft bulkhead and adapter interface is expanded to
include linear deployment aids, retention system for flexi-
ible connectors, etc, the impact on ground operations must
be reevaluated.
6) Payload wiring from aft flight deck to aft bulkhead interface
is adequate without field installed capability.
7) It is an Orbiter function to verify the interface integrity
from the T-0 umbilicals to the aft bulkhead interface and
aft flight deck standard wiring to aft bulkhead.
8) The aft flight deck monitor and control equipment (flight
unit) will be functionally verified with the payload, by the
payload, before installation in the Orbiter.
9) Payload primary power panel is used for a nondeployable pay-
load.
3.0 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
----------------------------------------------------------------
Detailed and conceptual design data have not matured sufficiently
to determine total impact on Tug/Shuttle mating/demating ground
operations. However, based on the ground rules and assumptions
of paragraph 2.0 herein, the following conclusions and recommenda-
tions can be made and should be considered for advance planning:
1) The payload retention system does not currently have an at-
tach point at Sta 1293.0.
2) The Tug does not have handling lugs for installation and
removal.
3) The adapter attach point (tilt pivot point) will have to be
inhibited from the remote latching system during deployment
and reinstated for payload removal.
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4.0 DISCUSSION
A function flow defining the Tug/Shuttle mating/demating activities,
including PCR/Tug mating, is depicted in Figure 2-2. Each inter-
face is discussed below as analyzed for Ground Operation impact.
4.1 PAYLOAD (TUG/SPACECRAFT/ADAPTER) INSTALLATION
During the course of this assessment, the payload was assumed to
interface with the PCR from the bottom to accommodate vertical
payload installation (baseline flow). It was also assumed that
a hoist would retract the payload from the canister, and a pay-
load manipulator was capable of transferring the payload from the
hoist to the manipulator arms, and installing the payload in the
Orbiter bay retention system. This concept has no impact, pro-
viding the canister can accommodate vertical hoisting, i.e., end
extraction capability with guide rails, and the PCR can be suf-
ficiently sealed with the Orbiter for a common clean environment.
Whether the vertical or horizontal payload installation concept
is employed, the payload must have the capability for manipulator
arm and/or horizontal handling adapter attachment while inserting
and transferring the payload into the retention system. This
capability would require flight type, hard points on the payload,
or GSE removable handling lugs.
4.2 PAYLOAD REMOVAL
The same comments for transfer of the payload, (para 4.1) apply
for payload removal. In addition, depending on Tug and/or space-
craft design, it is foreseeable that the capability must exist
for retaining a minimum power level on the busses. This would
particularly be true of an onboard computer system that would
lose memory and/or issue random discretes during a zero power
condition. This could result in an unsafe payload during the
removal process. A possible solution would be a battery charging
capability from the Orbiter to the payload batteries. Having
this capability would also eliminate some spacecraft trickle
charge GSE requirements during the final countdown phase.
During the payload removal process, the GSE handling equipment
must be adjusted to coincide with the payload cg. It is conceiv-
able that on some return flights, i.e., aborts and retrieval mis-
sions, the cg will have to be preestablished by analysis. This
data may be flight data, ascertained by the Orbiter in the case
of an abort, and/or the ground control station in the case of a
retrieval mission. The techniques, methodology, and data require-
ments will need preplanning (before Orbiter landing and safing)
so that payload removal will not impact the baseline flow and
timeline.
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4.3 T-O LAUNCH UMBILICALS
There were no apparent problems identified with the T-0 Launch
Umbilical concept. It was assumed that the Orbiter would verify
the integrity of the umbilicals from the panel to the aft bulk-
head.
4.4 PRELAUNCH UMBILICAL
Baseline Tug documentation does not define an interface connector
for the prelaunch umbilical panel. However, this umbilical may
be required when the spacecraft is defined.
4.5 PAYLOAD RETENTION SYSTEM
There were no apparent problems identified with the payload guides
and remote latching system concept. As presently designed, i.e.,
with the adapter tilt pivot point, the same as a latching point,
the remote latch will need to be inhibited during deployment and
reinstated for payload removal.
4.6 REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
This interface was not assessed because it was considered to be
a mission operation function.
4.7 AFT FLIGHT DECK PAYLOAD OPERATION EQUIPMENT
The monitor and control equipment interface (hSS/PSS/Orbiter/
Payload) was assumed to be compatible. In accordance with the
baseline flow, during the Functional Interface Test (FIT) the
actual flight MSS/PSS consoles will be functionally verified with
the payload using an orbiter wiring harness simulator. The MSS/
PSS consoles will then be installed in the orbiter at the OPF.
4.8 PAYLOAD TO AFT BULKHEAD INTERFACE ,
All defined Tug-related electrical and fluid umbilicals pass
through the Tug adapter to the aft bulkhead. The current deploy-
ment concept requires these umbilicals (adapter/aft bulkhead)
to remain engaged for the duration of a Tug roundtrip mission.
A common problem for any concept will be access to verify the
integrity of the interface during and after mate. This problem
is compounded when (1) a flexible line concept is considered be-
cause a retention system will probably be required to retain the
lines during mating condition; (2) deployment aids are being con-
sidered to rotate the payload out of the Orbiter Bay; and (3) a
remotely controlled retractable plate will require visual aids for
mating and demating.
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This concept results in poor accessibility for both the horizontal
and vertical payload installation and removal.
4.9 PAYLOAD TO FORWARD BULKHEAD INTERFACE
Baseline Tug documentation does not define an interface require-
ment for this location.
4.10 AFT FLIGHT DECK TO AFT BULKHEAD WIRING
It is assumed that the standard wiring harness from the MSS/PSS
consoles is adequate. A requirement to provide a payload peculiar
wiring harness has not been identified.
4.11 PAYLOAD PRIMARY POWER PANEL
Tug baseline documentation does not define an interface at this
umbilical panel.
4.12 TUG TILT ATTACH POINT (STA 1293)
The current Tug tilt point at Sta 1293 is not a standard load
carrying retention point in accordance with the Space Shuttle Sys-
tem Payload Accommodation document.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
----------------------------------------------------
This study/analysis includes several definitions of the term
"access" and spans the various phases of Tug processing. The Ac-
cess is defined as (1) physical access related to changeout of
line replaceable units (LRUs), (2) functional access for verifi-
cation of replaced LRUs and accomplishment of subsystem/system
health checks and monitoring, and (3) service access for loading
required mission consumables and safing at Tug retrieval and be-
fore Tug refurbishment.
2.0 STUDY GROUND RULES AND ASSUMPTIONS
1) Refurbishment and unscheduled maintenance shall be limited to
LRUs for the purpose of this study. Hardware items consid-
ered in this category are delineated in Table 3-1. Software
items are considered replaceable by means of normal communi-
cations at any time up to and during launch and orbit, and
therefore will not be considered a part of this study.
2) No maintenance (replacement of LRUs) shall be accomplished
after Tug/payload is installed in the Orbiter payload bay.
However, access of a functional or service nature will be re-
quired. Physical access should be provided for up to this
installation point to include changeout of LRUs at payload
changeout room (PCR) assuming reverification capability is
provided at that location.
3) Total Launch Processing System (LPS) capability shall be
available to Tug/payload up to a minimum of T-0 or later in
the countdown to provide total Tug/payload checkout.
4) This study is based on the configuration definition contained
in MSFC documentation 68M00039-2, dated July 15, 1974, en-
titled "Baseline Space Tug Configuration Definition," and
MSFC 68M00039-4, dated July 15, 1974, entitled "Baseline
Space Tug Ground Operations, Verification, Analysis, and
Processing."
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3.0 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
---------------------------------------------------------
During the course of this study, various access provisions (physi-
cal, functional, and servicing) were evaluated based on concep-
tual design data currently available. In general, four physical
access problems were detected relating to the L1 2 submerged
valves, the helium spheres located in the intertank region, the
LO2 capacitive mass probe, and the APS hydrazine spheres. One
functional access problem related to post-Orbiter installation
interface verification and one servicing access problem related
to fuel cell reactant loading were found.
3.1 PHYSICAL ACCESS PROBLEMS
Details relating to the four problems are contained in para 4.1.1,
4.1.2, 4.1.3, and 4.1.4, respectively. Two alternative design
solutions to alleviate the problems are (1) increase the access
door size in the intertank region to approximately 36x36 in. andthe addition of an access hatch in the aft end of the LH2 tank and
the L0 2 tank, or (2) increase forward hatch size.
3.2 FUNCTIONAL ACCESS PROBLEM
Details relating to this problem are contained in para 4.2.2.1.
The problem requires addition of monitoring switches to verify
connect/disconnect of umbilicals and Tug mounting points that are
not visually accessible for mating interface inspection.
3.3 SERVICE ACCESS PROBLEM
Details relating to this problem are contained in para 4.2.3.1.
The problem involves the addition of servicing connections at the
Orbiter interface for fuel cell reactant loading and topping.
3.4 ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
During performance of this study, it was further noted that by
rearrangement of selected LRUs, the refurbishment and checkout
could be accomplished on a modular basis that would shorten and
simplify the turnaround requirements. The modular approach would
develop the Tug into avionics and propulsion modules, and would
require the relocation of avionics LRU and the active thermal con-
trol system from the intertank region to the forward skirt. This
approach, however, could have some disadvantages.
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4.0 TUG/PAYLOAD ACCESS PROVISIONS
4.1 PHYSICAL ACCESS PROVISION
This portion of the study.was primarily directed toward replace-
ment of LRUs, and the adequacy of defined existing physical ac-
cess provisions, with consideration given to man/machine relations
and GSE requirements to support the changeout and verification/
reverification task. It was necessary to perform additional anal-
ysis in order to arrive at a probable list of LRUs that would be
contained in the Space Tug. Table 3-1 lists those LRUs that were
evident from the limited data available at this time. Further,
it was an objective of this study to provide identification of
potential design problems and recommended solutions.
Adequacy of physical access provision is dependent on several
major concerns related to the individual hardware item, such as
redundancy, mission criticality, size, weight, and Tug processing
phase. Table 3-1 shows the Physical Access Evaluation with items
judged critical discussed in subsequent paragraphs. An asterisk
(*) by a "TBS" indicates exact physical characteristics are unknown.
4.1.1 LH 2 Horizontal Dump Valves and Fill, Drain, and Prevalve
Although valves may exist that are LH 2 compatible, these particu-
lar valves will be required to last for 20 missions. It is highly
possible that in this severe thermal environment performance de-
gradation can be expected. Therefore, serious consideration must
be given to making these valves more accessible by inclusion of
a removable hatch cover in the near vicinity of valve mounting
locations. The problem is further compounded by lack of redun-
dancy of these critical components. Possible solutions are to
add the aforementioned access provision in the intertank region,
or provide periodic replacement that would require additional GSE
to gain access into the tank via forward dome cover. This cover
would also require an increase in size. The former is the pre-
ferred solution. It should be noted that the problem also exists
with the LH 2 vertical and horizontal vent valves.
4.1.2 Helium Sphere Intertank Region
Access door located at Sta 1128 is 30 inches square, whereas the
helium sphere has an approximate diameter (based on defined vol-
ume) of 29 inches. This condition would not allow clearance for
handling equipment in the event that a problem in the sphere re-
quired its removal. This then would require that the Tug be sep-
arated at the optional field splice, Sta 1061.74, which would be
costly and time consuming. It is, therefore, recommended that
the access door is increased to 36 inches square.
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Table 3-1 Physical Access Evaluation
SLEGEND:
4PHYSICAL
DATA S=STRUCTURES
BASELINE P=PROPULSION
DIMENSION WEIGHT TUG TUG GSE T=THERMAL CONT.
I ALRU (INCHES) (POUNDS) LOCATION ACCESS DEFINITION A=AVIONICSN HARDWARE
DESCRIPTION REMARKS/NOTES
S 1 Docking Mech. TBS* 230.0 Fwd. Skirt Adequate Adequate Note 5
2 LH 2 Aft Support 1.75 dia x TBS 2.9 Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
3 LO 2 Aft Support 2.00 dia x TBS 1.6 Aft Skirt Adequate Adequate Note 2
4 Latching Mech. TBS* 10.6 Aft Adapt. Adequate Adequate Note 3
5 Thrust Structure 91 dia x 24.8 Aft Skirt Adequate Adequate Note 2, with main
28.5 x 7 dia engine removed
S P 1 Main Engine 70.6 dia x 110 442 Aft Skirt Adequate Adequate Note 2
2 (F&D) Solenoid Cont TBS* TBS* Intertank/ Adequate Adequate Notes 2 & 4
Valve Aft Skirt
3 LH 2 Dump Valve TBS TBS LH 2 Tank Inadequate Inadequate See para. 4.1.2
4 LH^ Fill and Drain TBS TBS LH 2 Tank Inadequate Inadequate See para. 4.1.2
& revalve
5 LH2 Fill & Drain Valve TBS* TBS* Aft Skirt Adequate Adequate Note 2
6 LH2 Coupler TBS* TBS* Aft Adapt Adequate Adequate Note 3
7 LH 2 Flex Line TBS* TBS* Aft Adapt Adequate Adequate Note 3
8 LH 2 Quick Disconnect TBS* TBS* Aft Skirt Adequate Adequate Note 2
9 LH 2 Vert. Vent Valves TBS TBS LH 2 Tank Inadequate Inadequate Similar to para.
4.1.2
10 LH 2 Horizontal Vent TBS TBS LH 2 Tank Inadequate Inadequate Similar to para.
4.1.2
i LH 2 Thermodynamic Vent TBS* 13.0 LH 2 Tank Adequate Adequate Note 4
Table 3-1 (cont)
LEGEND:
PHYSICAL S=STRUCTURES
DATA BASELINE P=PROPULSION
DIMENSION WEIGHT TUG TUG GSE T=THERMAL CONT.
LRU (INCHES) (POUNDS) LOCATION ACCESS DEFINITION A=AVIONICSM HARDWARE
DESCRIPTION REMARKS/NOTES
12 LO Fill, Drain & Dump TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate dequate Notes 1 & 2
Valve )r Aft Skirt
13 LO 2 Prevalve TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate kdequate Notes 1 & 2
)r Aft Skirt
d 14 LO 2 Coupler TBS* TBS* Ift Adapt. Adequate idequate Note 3
15 LO 2 Flex Line TBS* TBS* Nft Adapt. Adequate idequate Note 3
,16 LO 2 Quick Disconnect rBS* TBS* &ft Skirt Adequate %dequate Note 2
17 (Vent) Solenoid Cont. rBS* TBS* [ntertank Adequate idequate Note 1
Valve
18 (Vent) LO2 Vent Valve rBS* TBS* Entertank Adequate dequate Note 1
19 LO 2 Thermodynamic Vent rBS* 13.0 DO2 Tank Adequate Ndequate Note 1
20 Helium Sphere 29 dia TBS Entertank/ Marginal idequate Notes 1 & 3, see
ft Adapt. para. 4.1.3
21 Solenoid Cont. Valve rBS* TBS* Intertank/ Adequate idequate Notes 1, 2 & 3
ft Skirt &
ft Adapt.
22 Helium Regulator rBS* TBS* Intertank/ Adequate idequate Notes 1 & 3
Ift Adapt.
23 Filter Assembly rBS* TBS* Entertank/ Adequate dequate Notes 1 & 3
kft Adapt.
24 Helium Vent Valve rBS* TBS* Entertank/ Adequate idequate Notes 1 & 3
kft Adapt.
Table 3-1 (cont)
LEGEND:
PHYSICAL S=STRUCTURES
DATA BASELINE P=PROPULSION
DIMENSION WEIGHT TUG TUG GSE T-THERMAL CONT.
SHARDWARE (INCHES) (POUNDS) LOCATION ACCESS DEFINITION A=AVIONICS
S-HARDWARE
IDESCRIPTION REMARKS/NOTES
25 Helium Quick Disconnect TBS* TBS* Aft Adapt Adequate Adequate Note 3
26 Helium Coupler TBS* TBS* Aft Adapt Adequate Adequate Note 3
27 Actuator Assembly TBS* TBS* Aft Skirt Adequate Adequate Note 2
28 Main Pump TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
29 Auxiliary Pump TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
30 Check Valve. TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
31 Solenoid Seq. Valve TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
32 Hi. Press. Relief Valve TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
33 Lo Press. Relief Valve TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
34 Bleed Valve TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
35 Filter TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
36 LO Capacitive Mass TBS TBS L2 Tank Inadequate TBS See Para 4.1.4
2 Probe 2
37 LH2 Capacitive Mass TBS* TBS* iH 2 Tank Adequate Adequate Note 5
Probe
38 LO2 Control Assy. TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
39 LH2 Control Assy. TBS* TBS* Fwd. Skirt Adequate Adequate Notes 4 & 5
40 Power Supply TBS* TBS* Fwd. Skirt Adequate Adequate Notes 4 & 5
41 Point Level Sensors TBS* TBS* L & LO2  Inadequate TBS Note 5, similar to
Cans 2 para 4.1.4
Table 3-1 (cont)
PHYSICAL LEGEND:
S=STRUCTURES
BASELINE P=PROPULSION
LRU DIMENSION WEIGHT TUG TUG GSE T-THERMAL CONT.M LRU (INCHES) (POUNDS) LOCATION ACCESS DEFINITION A=AVIONICS
SHARDWARE
S DESCRIPTION I REMARKS/NOTES
42 APS Motor Assy. 30 x 30 x TBS 50.0 Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
43 Solenoid Fuel Valve TBS* TBS* APS Assy. Adequate Adequate Note 1
44 Solenoid Fuel Prevalve TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
45 Filter TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
46 N2H4 Press. Guage TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
47 N2 H4 Fill Q.D. TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
48 N2 H4 Vent Q.D. TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
49 N2 H4 Sphere 32 dia TBS Intertank Inadequate Adequate See para 4.1.5
50 Helium Vent Valve TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
51 Helium Press. Guage TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
52 Helium Regulator TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
53 Helium Sphere 29 dia TBS Intertank Inadequate Inadequate Same as para 4.1.3
54 Helium Q.D. TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
T 1 Elect. Heater TBS* TBS* Fwd. Skirt Adequate Adequate Notes 4.& 5
2 Freon Accum. TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
3 Freon Fill Valve TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
4 Freon Pump TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
Table 3-1 (cont)
01.LEGEND:
PHYSICAL S=STRUCTURES
DATA BASELINE P=PROPULSION
DIMENSION WEIGHT TUG 
TUG GSE T-THERMAL CONT.
LRU (INCHES) (POUNDS) LOCATION ACCESS DEFINITION A=AVIONICS
w HARDWARE
d H DESCRIPTION I REMARKS/NOTES
5 Dryer Assembly TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 
1
6 Filter TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
7 Filter Bypass Valve TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
.8 Heat Exchanger TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
9 Radiator 24 x 48 x TBS TBS intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
10 Selector Valve TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
11 Flow Control Valve TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
12 Temp. Sensor TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
13 Helium Cont. Valve TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
14 Helium Regulator TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
15 Helium Vent Valve TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
16 Heat Pipe x x 120 TBS Intertank/ Adequate Adequate Notes 1, 4 & 5
Fwd. Skirt
17 Thermal Splice TBS* TBS* Intertank/ Adequate Adequate Notes 1, 4 & 5
Fwd. Skirt
18 LH2 Purge Press. Reg. TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 
1
19 LO2 Purge Press. Reg. TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate 
Note 1
20 LH2 Purge Cont. Valve TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
21 LO2 Purge Cont. Valve TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
Table 3-1 (cont)
LEGEND:
PHYSICAL S=STRUCTURES
DATA BASELINE P=PROPULSION
DIMENSION WEIGHT TUG TUG GSE T=THERMAL CONT.
SLRU (INCHES) (POUNDS) LOCATION ACCESS DEFINITION A=AVIONICS
u E HARDWARE
S DESCRIPTION REMARKS/NOTES
22 LH2 Purge Vent-Valve TBS* TBS* Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
23 LO2 Purge Vent Valve TBS* TBS* Aft Skirt Adequate Adequate Note 2
24 Radiation Shield TBS TBS Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate Notes 4 and 5
A 1 IMU 16.00 Sphere 42.0 Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate Notes 4 and 5
2 Rate Gyro 7 x 6 x 3 9.0 Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate Notes 4 and 5
3 Star Tracker 5 dia x 12 12.5 Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate Notes 4 and 5
4 Sun Sensor 6.9 x 6.5 x 3 4.66 Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate Notes 4 and 5
5 Cont. Electronics 12 x 12 x 18 50 Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate Notes 4 and 5
6 ACCE Lerometer TBS* TBS Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate Notes 4 and 5
7 Laser Radar TBS* 35.0 Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate Notes 4 and 5
8 Laser Radar Elect. TBS* TBS Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate Notes 4 and 5
9 Computer 5.4 x 10.5 x 65.0 Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate Notes 4 and 5
19.8
10 Aux. Memory 9.6 x 8.1 x 20.0 Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate Notes 4 and 5
5.8
1 Comp. I/F Unit 9.9 x 5.0 x 5.0 Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate Notes 4 and 5
13.9
12 Data I/F Unit 9.9 x 9.9 x 5.0 Intertank/ Adequate Adequate Notes 1, 4 and 5
13.9 Fwd Skirt
Table 3-1 (cont)
LEGEND:
PHYSICAL S=STRUCTURES
DATA BASELINE P=PROPULS ION
DIMENSION WEIGHT TUG TUG GSE T=THERMAL CONT.
LRU (INCHES) (POUNDS) LOCATION ACCESS DEFINITION A=AVIONICS
S HARDWARE
DESCRIPTION REMARKS/NOTES
13 Orbiter I/F Unit TBS* TBS* Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate Notes 4 and 5
4 Buffer/Formatter 9.9 x 5.0 x 10.0 Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate Notes 4 and 5
13.9
5 Tape Recorder 9.6 x 7.9 x 12.5 Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate Notes 4 and 5
5.8
6 Signal Conditioner TBS* TBS* Fwd Skirt/ Adequate Adequate Notes 1, 2, 4 and 5
Intertank
& Aft Skirt
.7 AESPA TBS* 26.0 External/ Adequate Adequate Notes 4 and 5
Fwd Skirt
8 Cmd Decoder TBS* 3.0 Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate otes 4 and 5
L9 Cmd Distributor TBS* 3.0 Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate Notes 4 and 5
0 T.V. Camera TBS* 7.0 Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate Notes 4 and 5
21 T.V. Electronics TBS* 7.0 Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate Notes 4 and 5
22 Measurement Sensors TBS* TBS* All Adequate Adequate Notes 1 thru 5
(15 types)
36
37 Fuel Cells 12 x 16 x 20 125/56 Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
38 Reactant Tank TBS 50 Intertank TBS TBS Note 1 (determination
of access adequacy
requires tank sizing
requirements)
Table 3-1 (concl-)
LEGEND:
PHYSICAL S=STRUCTURES
BASELINE P=PROPULSION
DIMENSION WEIGHT TUG TUG GSE T=THERMAL CONT.
LRU (INCHES) (POUNDS) LOCATION ACCESS DEFINITION A=AVIONICS
S0HARDWARE
" ~ DESCRIPTION REMARKS /NOTES Q
39 Thermal Cont. Distr. TBS* 12 Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
40 Battery 9 x 8 x 8 20 Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
41 Pwr. Proc. Unit 9 x 9 x 8 8.0 Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
42 Pwr. Distributor 12 x 15 x 8 12.0 Fwd Skirt/ Adequate Adequate Notes 1, 4 and 5
Intertank
43 Cont. Distributor 10 x 10 x 6 10.0 Intertank Adequate Adequate Note.l
44 Main. Eng. Distr. 8 x 8 x 6 8 . 0 Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
45 APS Distributor TBS* * Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1
NOTES:
1. Access through door in main skirt, located at =station 1128.0+ Z axis.
2. Access through back of aftskirt when aft adapter is removed, Iccated at z'station 1172.902, entire
circumference.
3. Access through forward end of aft adapter when adapter is removed from Tug, located at rstation 1172.902,
entire circumference.
4. Access through doors in forward skirt, at "%station 997.24 between +z and +Y axis.
5. Access through front end of fwd skirt with spacecraft not installed, at vstation 935.99.
* Exact physical characteristics are unknown; however, general physical characteristics are
sufficiently known to judge adequacy of access.
4.1.3 L02 Capacitive Mass Probe
The probability of a failure of the probe is rather remote, but
is a distinct possibility, and such a failure would result in the
need to remove the LO2 tank to replace the probe. It is conceiv-
able, however, that a hatch could be added in the aft end of the
L02 tank that would allow for replacement of the capacitive mass
probe as well as the level sensors.
4.1.4 APS Hydrazine Sphere
Current state-of-the-art materials and design techniques would
indicate that the bladder contained in the hydrazine tanks may
deteriorate before completion of 20 missions. Therefore, replace-
ment and/or refurbishment of these tanks could be required. Access
provisions identified for the intertank region in baseline docu-
mentation would not permit removal of this tank unless the Tug
was separated at optional field splice Sta 1061.74. The recom-
mended solution would be to increase the access door size, as
indicated in para 4.1.2.
4.2 FUNCTIONAL AND SERVICE ACCESS PROVISIONS
This portion of the study was primarily directed toward the vari-
ous functional blocks contained on the green light functional
flow diagram developed under task 1.0. For purposes of this spe-
cial emphasis study, it is convenient to combine the assessment
of both functional and service access, as defined in para 1.0,
because of their common origin in the flow diagram. Table 3-2
identifies each functional block and its required accessibility,
and only those items having an apparent access problem are delin-
eated in subsequent paragraphs.
Further, functional access primarily requiring an electrical or
cabling interface is at this time considered adequate because of
the lack of design definition in this area, and allowing confi-
dence in competent designers to provide these provisions based on
well-defined electrical and functional interface requirements.
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Table 3-2 Functional/Service Access Evaluation
TYPE OF LEGEND
ACCESS S=STRUCTURES
FUNCTIONAL P=PROPULS ION
DESCRIPTION TUG BASELINE T=THERMAL CONT
(OPERATIONAL u LOCATION ACCESS GSE
FLOW) r DEFINITION
o REMARKS/NOTES
Del. T/A to KSC x
Shuttle Airfield
Unload T/A from x
Aircraft
P Verify and check x Various Adequate Adequate Visual
tank breather and Inspection/Data
trans. instr. Analysis
Move T/A to TPF x
Perform receiving x Various Adequate Adequate Visual
inspection Inspection
Install T/A in x Various Adequate Adequate
refurb. and
cleaning fixture
Install ship x Fwd. skirt Adequate Adequate Note 1
loose equipment & intertank
Clean T/A x Entire T/A kdequate Adequate
Move T/A to TPF x
C/O Area
Install T/A in x Entire T/A Adequate Adequate
Maint. and C/O
Fixture
Shuttle Flt Ops x
Orbiter Land at x
SHA
Orbiter Safe x
Verif. and Crew
Exchange
Tow Orbiter to x
OPF
Unload Orbiter, x
Prop. F/C, Vent
Press and Safe
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TabZe 3-2 (cont)
TYPE OF LEGEND
FUNCTIONAL ACCESS S=STRUCTURES
DESCRIPTION TUG BASELINE P=PROPULSION
(OPERATIONAL LOCATION ACCESS GSE =THERMAL CONT.
FLOW) DEFINITION A=AVIONICS
REMARKS/NOTES
Install Orbiter x
GSE and Open P/L
Bay Doors
Remove P/L and x Entire T/A Adequate Adequate
Install on
Transporter
A Remove Tape x Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate Note 1, Item A-15
Recorder
Remove S/C as x Fwd Skirt, Adequate Adequate
required
Remove x Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate
COMMSEC Equip.
Move T A to TPF x Entire T/A N/A Adequate
airlock
P Safe and Remove x TBS TBS TBS Note 2
Unexp. ordnance
A Service F/C and x Aft Skirt Adequate Adequate Note 1, Items
Reactant Tanks A-37 and A-38
P Drain and Purge x Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1, Items
APS Lines and P-43 thru P-49
Tanks
P Purge LO2 Tank x Aft Skirt Adequate Adequate
P Purge LH2 Tank x Aft Skirt Adequate Adequate
A Remove Battery x Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1, Item A-40
P Vent Remaining x Aft Skirt Adequate Adequate
Pressurants
S Separate Tug x Aft Skirt Adequate Adequate
from Adapter
Visual Damage x All Adequate Adequate Note 3
Insp. Tug
Clean and Prep. x All Adequate Adequate
to Move Tug
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Table 3-2 (cont)
TYPE OF LEGEND
ACCESS S=STRUCTURES
FUNCTIONAL P=PROPULS ION
DESCRIPTION TUG BASELINE T=THERMAL CONT.
(OPERATIONAL LOCATION ACCESS GSE
FLOW) - > DEFINITION
Sz REMARKS/NOTES
Move Tug to TPF, x Entire Tug Adequate Adequate
C/O Area
Install Tug in x Entire Tug Adequate Adequate
Maint. /checkout
fixture
Isolate failed x Fwd skirt/ Adequate Adequate Note 1
hardware causing intertank
mission anomalies and aft
skirt
Update post-flt x
Maint. Activity
Plan
Scheduled pre- x Fwd. Skirtl Adequate Adequate
Maint. Test Intertank
and aft
skirt
Complete Repl. x Fwd. Skirt/ Adequate Adequate Note 1
Comp. Kit Build- Intertank
up and aft
skirt
Sched. Maint. & x Fwd Skirt/ Adequate Adequate
Modifications Intertank
and aft
skirt
Unschd. Maint. x Fwd Skirt/ Adequate Adequate Note 4
Intertank
and aft
skirt
Mission Config. x Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate This activity
limited to soft-
ware and COMMSEC
equipment
Install Adapt. x
in Maint. and
CJO Fixture
Isolate failed x Aft adapter Adequate Adequate Note I
hardware causing
anomaly
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Table 3-2 (cont)
TYPE OF LEGEND
ACCESS S=STRUCTURESFUNCTIONAL
P=PROPULSIONDESCRIPTION TUG BASELINE
(OPERATIONAL LOCATION ACCESS GSE TTHERMAL CONT.
FLOW) DEFINITION A=AVIONICS
nz P4 REMARKS/NOTES
Sched. Maint. & x Aft Adequate Adequate
Mods. Adapter
Unsched. Maint. x Aft Adequate Adequate Note 4
Adapter
System x Aft Adequate Adequate Deployment C/O
Verification Adapter
Prep for mate x
with Tug
Mate Tug/Adapter x Aft Skirt Adequate Adequate
Verify Mech. and and Adapter
Elect. Interfaces
A Electrical pre- x Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate
power checks Intertank
A Critical align- x Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate
ment verification
A Apply Pwr to T/A x Fwd skirt Adequate Adequate
intertank
and aft
skirt
A Load PCM Data x Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate
Format and Aft
Skirt
A Measurement x All Adequate Adequate Step Cal. signals
system E to E in lieu of sensor
calibration stimulation
A Replaced LRU's x All Adequate Adequate
verification
T Service Active x Intertank Adequate Adequate Freon Service
T/C System Available in
Intertank Region
Verify S/C Inter- x Fwd Skirt kdequate Adequate Visual Inspection,
face and prep. elect. & mech.
for IST connect ions
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Table 3-2 (cont)
TYPE OF LEGEND
FUNCTIONAL ACCESS S= STRUCTURES
FUNCTIONAL P=PROPULSION
DESCRIPTION TUG BASELINE T=HERMAL CONT.
(OPERATIONAL LOCATION ACCESS GSE
FLOW) DEFINITION
. c I IREMARKS/NOTES
A Load and verify x Fwd Skirt/ Adequate Adequate Computer
computer soft- Aft Skirt Simulation
ware
1 Systems Health x All Adequate Adequate LPS Checkout
Check
P Install ordnance x TBS TBS TBS Note 4
and safe
S Mate T/A and x Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate
Spacecraft
Connect S/C GSE x
or connect S/C
Sim.
T/S - S/C inter- x Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate Visual inspect-
face verification ion elect. &
mech. connections
A Load and Verify x Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate Computer
Comp. Flight and Aft Simulation
Software - Skirt
All Functional I/F x All Adequate Adequate LPS Checkout
Test
S/C to STDN/ x Non-Secure
TDRSS/SCF comm- Spacecraft
unication verify
A P/L to orbiter x Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate TPF - has adequat
communication external antenna
verify sys tem
P Connect and x TBS TBS TBS Note 4
verify ordnance
safe
A Install flight x Intertank Adequate Adequate Note 1, Item
battery. A-40
Move to APS x
propellant load-
ing area
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Table 3-2 (cont)
TYPE OF LEGEND
ACCESS S=STRUCTURES
FUNCTIONAL P=PROPULSION
DESCRIPTION TUG BASELINE T=HERMAL CON(OPERATIONAL t T--THERMAL CONT.(OPERATIONAL LOCATION ACCESS GSE
FLOW) > 4 DEFINITION A=AVIONICS
SCAREMARKS/NOTES
P Load APS, Leak x Intertank Adequate Adequate
Check and Secure
P Partial Tug x Intertank Adequate Adequate APS - He tank to
Press Load 3000 psia
Prep to move and x
install in P/L
cannister
Verify cannister x All Adequate Adequate
enviro. and move
to pad.
Install cannister x All Adequate Adequate
on PCR and mate
P/L to facility
Remove GSE, prot. x
covers and prep.
for Orbiter mate
Extend PCR, open x
P/L bay doors
S Mate P/L with x Aft Adequate Adequate Mech. Mate and
Orbiter Adapter Umbilical Conn-
ect.
P/L - Orbiter x Aft Marginal Adequate See para 4.2.2.1
Interface Adapter
Verification and main
shell
A Payload Measure- x All Adequate Adequate LPS/Orbiter
ment Profile Step Cal. for
Orbiter Record.
Verification
All Orbiter - P/L x All Adequate Adequate LPS Checkout
functional inter-
face verify
Final S/C servic- x
ing and flight
prep. (N/F)
Cabin closeout x
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Table 3-2 (cont)
TYPE OF LEGEND
ACCESS S=STRUCTURES
FUNCTIONAL P=PROPULSION
DESCRIPTION TUG BASELINE T=THERMAL CONT.
(OPERATIONAL LOCATION ACCESS GSE
FLOW) DEFINITION
SREMARKS/NOTES
Close Orbiter x
P/L Bay Doors
S/C in Standby x
Status
Retract PCR and x
Pad Closeout
P Load Pressurants x Aft Adequate Adequate
Adapter
Service
Panel
AlL Countdown x
P Load LH2  x Aft Adequate Adequate
Adapter &
Service
Panel
P Load LO2  x Aft Adequate Adequate
Adapter
& Service
Panel
P Load F/C x Aft Adapter Inadequate Adequate See para. 4.2.3.1
Reactants and Service
Panel
Terminal Count- x All Inadequate Adequate See para. 4.2.3.1
down and launch
Record flight x
performance data
(real time)
Analyze flt x
perf. data
Prep. post-flt x
maint. activity
plan
Draw spares and x
mod. comp. for
replace.
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Table 3-2 (cont)
TYPE OF LEGEND
ACCESS S=STRUCTURES
P=PROPULS ION
DESCRIPTION TUG BASELINE
(OPERATIONAL LOCATION ACCESS GSE T-THERMAL CONT.
FLOW) U > DEFINITION A=AVIONICS
E r. REMARKS/NOTES
All Flight Abort x
Orbiter Land at x
SHA
Safe Orb, Systems x
and connect gnd.
cooling
P Connect LH2 gnd x Aft Adapter Adequate Adequate
vent and dump and Service
lines Panel
P Boil-off and x
burn LH2
P Purge LO2 tank x Aft Adapter Adequate Adequate
and lines and Service
Panel
P Purge LH2 Tank x Aft Adapter Adequate Adequate
and Lines and Service
Panel
11 Verify systems x All Adequate Adequate Limited to LH
safe and prep to and LO Drain 2
move 2 and Purge
Move Orbiter to x
OPF
Unload Orbiter x
Prop,, vent press.
and safe systems
Install GSE, open x
P/L bay doors
S Remove Payload & x Entire T/A Adequate Adequate
Install on Trans-
porter
S Separate S/C x Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate
from T/A
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Table 3-2 (concZ)
TYPE OF LEGEND
ACCESS S=STRUCTURES
FUNCT IONAL P=PROPULSION
DESCRIPTION TUG BASELINE T--HERMAL CONT.
(OPERATIONAL LOCATION ACCESS GSE A=AVIONICS
FLOW) V > DEFINITION
oo REMARKS/NOTES
A Remove COMMSEC x Fwd Skirt Adequate Adequate
Equipment
Processing flow x
evaluation,
NOTES:
1. Evaluated as LRU's, Ref. Table 2.1.5-1 for LRU accessibility.
2. Need further ordnance and safety data to determine adequacy of access.
3. Primarily structural visual inspection, identify LRU replacement requirements.
4. Ref. Table 2.1.5-1 for candidateLRU's.
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4.2.2 Functional Access Problems
During payload-to-Orbiter interface verification of mechanical and
electrical connections, there exists the necessity to perform visual
inspection of umbilical and payload mounting points in the Orbiter
bay. Current baseline design in conjunction with payload accommoda-
tions documentation would indicate that payload mounting points,
in general, are accessible with the exception of that point located
at Sta 1128 in the minus z axis. In order to perform this verifica-
tion, one of two possible solutions become apparent. The first
would be to provide some form of TV monitoring in the Orbiter pay-
load bay that would allow complete visual access along the under-
side of the payload, or provide switch monitoring of all physical
connection points with connect/disconnect status displayed in the
Orbiter cabin. This latter solution is preferred as the most econo-
mical and the least weight penalty fix to provide adequate access.
This problem also exists with regard to visual inspection of umbil-
ical connections; the indicated solutions could also correct this
problem.
4.2.3 Service Access Problems
During propellant load phase of the countdown, a requirement ex-
ists to load fuel cell reactants. The baseline configuration docu-
ment implies that these will be LH2 and L02 . The Shuttle payload
accommodations documentation indicates provision for GH2 and G02for accumulator filling. This would result in the need for addition
of liquid provision on both the fuel and oxidizer servicing panels
to accommodate fill, drain of reactant tanks, as well as topping
activities during terminal countdown.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
----------------------,---------- -------------------
Payload changeout has been investigated to determine the functional,
timeline, and resource requirements for changing out various payload
alternatives after the payload has been installed in the Orbiter
bay. The payload changeout alternatives include changeout (1) space-
craft only, (2) Tug only, (3) both spacecraft and Tug, and (4) space-
craft only with Tug remaining in the Orbiter bay. The time for
changeout considered were (1) before fuel cell reactant loading
(T-10 hr), before cryogenic loading of main propellants (T-2 hr),
and after cryogenic loading of main propellants (T-1 hr). These
three times generally cover the range of significant impacts and
requirements to the Shuttle, payload, and the facility.
Payload changeout can be initiated as a result of two conditions:
(1) a failure in some payload element, and (2) a priority payload
requirement (e.g., a payload of opportunity). A failed payload
element could cause either a Spacecraft or a Tug to be changed
out, whereas a priority payload could cause either a spacecraft
or an entire payload to be changed out. The exact combination
changed out will depend not only on these conditions but will
also depend on the traffic or mission model and the status of
other Tugs and spacecraft at the time changeout is initiated. For
this reason, all possible changeout combinations have been included.
Summary and Conclusions - Table 4-1 summarizes the impact of chang-
ing out the various alternatives on the resources and timelines.
Shuttle timelines are affected by all payload changeouts, otherwise
the impact.on the Shuttle is zero if changeout is initiated before
reactant loading for fuel cells (T-10 hr). If fuel cell reactants
have been loaded, they must be unloaded and purged. If changeout
occurs after external tank loading, the external tanks must be un-
loaded and purged. The Shuttle must be "safed" for personnel access.
This includes: reducing storage vessel pressures to levels con-
sistent with manned access, safing all ordnance circuits, and de-
activating all ordnance and energy system busses, e.g., OMS, RCS,
etc. Regardless of when changeout occurs (T-10, T-2 or T-1) the
Orbiter bay doors must be cycled open/closed 2 to 4 times depend-
ing on what is changed out; and additionally, the Orbiter power
must be removed from the Tug.
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Table 4-1 Impact of Changeout on Resources and Timelines
Impact Impact Shown as Delta to "Green Light" Requirements
Item Timelines
Changed Manpower, (Additional hr
Out GSE Facility hr Software to Launch) Remarks
Spacecraft Only No Impact Spacecraft 310 (T-1) LPS Program for 37 (T-l) Priority
Stowage in 304 (T-2) Unloading and 33 (T-2) Spacecraft
PCR (Two) 264 (T-10) Safing 19 (T-10) Changeout
Spacecraft or
Access in Spacecraft
Orbiter Bay No-Go
PCR Crane
Translation
Payload
Manipulator
Mate/Fit of
Tug and
Spacecraft
Spacecraft No Impact 256 (T-1) 33 (T-1) Priority
and Tug 230 (T-2) 30 (T-2) Changeout
210 (T-10) 22 (T-10) or
Spacecraft
No-Go
Tug Only Spacecraft 342 (T-l) 42 (T-1) Tug No-Go
Stowage in 325 (T-2) 38 (T-2)
PCR (Two) 296 (T-10) 30 (T-10)
Spacecraft
Access in
Orbiter Bay
PCR Crane
Translation
Payload
Manipulator
Mate/Fit of
Tug and
Spacecraft
Spacecraft 243 (T-l) 31 (T-1) Priority
Only - Tug 226 (T-2) 28 (T-2) Spacecraft
Remains in 197 (T-10) 20 (T-10) Changeout
Orbiter Bay or
Spacecraft
No-Go
It is the conclusion of the study that:
1) Changeout of the total payload should be considered the standard
approach if spacecraft-to-Tug integration can be done "off-line"
and in "parallel time."
2) For priority payload changeout, total payload changeout should
be considered standard unless the option to keep the Tug in the
Orbiter bay is retained.
3) For changeout of certain spacecraft (regardless of reason), the
option of retaining the Tug in the Orbiter is attractive and
should be considered.
4) If another Shuttle/Tug is within 28 to 42 hours of launch
readiness, payload changeout may not always be the best alter-
native for priority payload missions.
2.0 GUIDELINES, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
Any spacecraft and/or Tug which is brought to the PCR for changout
will be ready for Tug and spacecraft integration.
The capability to routinely mate and integrate the Tug and space-
craft in the PCR exists independently of the changeout requirement.
The ability of the Shuttle facility to unload cryogenics and pres-
surants from the Shuttle and the Tug exists independently of the
changeout requirement (a contingency capability).
The baseline function No. 6.7 and 6.9 of the operational baseline
define the Tug/Orbiter interface testing which is required as an
operational routine. These same interface tests must be performed
again on all payload changeouts where the Tug has been physically
separated from the Orbiter.
3.0 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
-------------- --------------'----- - - - - - -- - - - - - -
As Table 4-1 depicts, for a priority Spacecraft changeout or space-
craft No-Go, the best approach is to changeout either the entire
payload or changeout the spacecraft only, but leave the Tug in the
Orbiter bay. Either of these options will save approximately 50
man-hours of effort and from one half to a full shift of time.
Replacing the entire payload is contingent upon the capability to
mate and integratethe spacecraft and'Tug "off-line" and in "paral-
lel time." If that contingency is not true for an individual case,
4-3
then removing the spacecraft but leaving the Tug in the Orbiter
bay is the attractive option. NASA TM X-64751, Revision 2, theOctober 1973 Space Shuttle Traffic Model, dated January 1974,
lists several spacecraft and Spacecraft combinations of lengths
and diameters and allow 360-deg access around the spacecraft in
the Orbiter bay, and clearance to lift the spacecraft from the
Tug (diameters from 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 10 ft, and lengths from
5 to 25 ft).
Changing out the Tug-only would occur only for a Tug No-Go and
that option would have to be traded off against the time required
and ability to fix the No-Go in place or in the PCR. Any repair
or replacement which takes less than 42 hours, to get back tolaunch would be an attractive alternative to Tug changeout.
There is no impact to the GSE for any of the payload changeout
options. This is primarily caused by the fact that PCR mate andintegration of spacecraft and Tug is one of the "green light" op-tions; and since that capability exists, it would be used for
changeout as well. Also, in general there are no GSE requirements
after the payload is moved to the pad (only facility and software
requirements).
The impact to the facility is minimal. The only additional re-
quirements that payload changeout imposes is on the PCR and thepayload manipulator. The PCR (Fig. 4-1) must be able to tempo-
rarily stow two spacecraft (the new one and the one being changed
out); and to do this, the PCR crane must have translation capa-
bility. The payload manipulator must provide access to and around
the spacecraft in the Orbiter bay and must accommodate a space-
craft-to-Tug mate and functional interface test (FIT) either inthe PCR or Orbiter bay (Fig. 4-2 and 4-3). Of course, the LPS
will be required to perform the FIT, but that requirement is not
unique to changeout so is not listed as an additional requirement.Also, it is noted that changeout of the entire payload imposes no
requirements on the facility above and beyond green light require-
ments.
The additional man-hours, and the additional hours required tolaunch the vehicle as depicted in Table 4-1 for the three condi-
tions were determined as shown in Figure 4-4.
The LPS programming for propellant/pressurant unloading and safingis listed as additional requirements to the green light even though
it is not unique to changeout. These programs will always be
required for every launch for contingencies that may arise during
a countdown.
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PCR Crane Translation C
-/PCR Crane ,
SOrbiter
.. Orbiter Orbiter
PCR Crane
Payload
Manipulator
Payload Manipulator r
A New
Space-
craft,
fpace 
TTu g Tug
craLPSf ta
PCR Floor FSF PCR Floor
Figure 4-1 Figure 4-2
PCR Crane and Spacecraft Stowage Requirements, Payload Manipulator Spacecraft and Tug Mating and
Spacecraft or Tug Changeout FIT Requirements in the PCR
PCR Crane
Orbiter
Payload Manipulator
New
Space-
craft\
Tug
S . Orbiter
Payload
Space- Panel
craft
PCR Floor LPS
Figure 4-3
Payload Manipulator Spacecraft and Tug Mating and
FIT Requirement in the Orbiter Bay
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Payload Payload Changeout Additional Green Light
Changeout Time Frame Time to Launch
Initiated
Payload
S Measurement
T-10 T-2 T-1 Extend PCR Profile T-10 T-2 T-1
V V V V V V V _
Spacecraft, Tug Remains in Orbiter
Spacecraft, Tug Only, and Tug
and Spacecraft
Spacecraft, Tug Remains in Orbiter
Spacecraft, Tug Only and Tug
and Spacecraft
Spacecraft, Tug Remains in Orbiter
Spacecraft, Tug Only and Tug
and Spacecraft
From Figures 6, 7, 8, 9 From "Green Light"F Stick and Ball Chart
Additional Man-Hours to Launch = Man-Hours for Payload Changeout and Additional Green Light
Additional Time to Launch = Payload Changeout Time and Additional Green Light Time
From Figures 6, 7, 8, 9 L _From Greenlight
Stick and Ball Chart
Figure 4-4
Method for Determining Additional Man-Hours and
Hours for PayZoad Changeout Options
4.0 DISCUSSION
-----------------------------------------------------
Each of the functions involved in each payload option has been
analyzed to determine the resource and timeline requirements. These
functions are depicted in Figure 4-5; the resource and timeline
requirements, as well as the functions, are depicted in Figures
4-6 through 4-9. Collectively, these figures make up the basic
analysis that led to the summary and conclusions.
It is noted that the assumption has been made that all Orbiter/Tug
interfaces must be reverified after disconnection. Some discus-
sion of that assumption is warranted. The,Tug/Orbiter interface
includes propellant lines, pressurant lines, and multi-pin elec-
trical connectors. These are each broken in all changeout options
except when the Tug remains in the Orbiter. Whenever these lines
are broken, the fluid lines must be reverified to leak criteria;
and continuity checks must be made on the pin connections. As
there is either a new Tug, new spacecraft, or both, the power on
tests must be redone on the new configuration. These tests should
be the same on the new configuration as on the original configura-
tion in order to have the same confidence at launch.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
----------------------- ^----------------------------
This special emphasis assessment considers the requirements
associated with Tug propellant loading so as to identify any
impact on the Orbiter before Orbiter PDR. Several secondary
goals to be accomplished by this study are:
1) Determine optimum location for loading APS propellants and
pressurants.
2) Provide synopsis of all propellant loading activities during
ground turnaround cycle.
3) Determine loading functions and identify design assumptions/
modifications for the Tug APS propellant loading, Tug APS/MPS
pressurant loading, Tug fuel cell reactant servicing, Tug
MLI purge, Tug MPS propellant loading, and fluid servicing
panels.
This special emphasis assessment relies extensively on the re-
sults of previous Tug ground operations where applicable.
2.0 GROUND RULES AND ASSUMPTIONS
----------------------------------------------------------------
1) Cryogenic propellant loading of the Orbiter External Tank
and Tug should be accomplished within the time span allowed
for External Tank loading.
2) Both LH2 and L0 2 may be loaded simultaneously.
3) Tug cryogenic propellant loading shall be accomplished re-
motely with the Tug in the Orbiter payload bay with the
payload bay doors closed.
4) Helium for the LH2 and L0 2 purge bags is supplied by the
ground and MPS pressurization systems.
5) MLI purge system is assumed.
6) MPS propellants can be vented through the thermodynamic vent
into the nonpropulsive vent for each system (Fig. 3.3-6,
Vent Relief System, Baseline Space Tug Configuration Defini-
tion, MSFC 68 M00039-2).
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3.0 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
-------------------------------------------
'------
Events relating to propellant activities were extracted from the
Tug ground operations functional flow diagram to provide a
summary reference. This propellant operations flow summary is
shown in Figure 5-1 in para 4.1.
Additional umbilicals were identified for the Orbiter LH 2 andL0 2 T-0 launch umbilical panels. They were (1) fuel cell supply,
(2) fuel cell vent, and (3) MLI purge vent.
Ground propellant activities on the Tug are predicted on Tug
conditions when it returns from a normal mission. This assumes
the main propellants have been vented to approximately 2 psia
in space, and the tanks repressurized with helium, any remaining
quantities of APS propellant and pressurant is locked up, the
Tug/Orbiter fluid umbilicals are reconnected, and the fuel cell
reactants are vented. The propellant and pressurant potential
hazards in the form of chemical energy (residual hydrogen vapors
and residual hydrazine) and pressure energy (MPS and APS) are
known and are safety manageable in Tug postlanding conditions.
The Tug APS system will be loaded with N 2H 4 in the TPF after
mating with the spacecraft and subsequent checkout. The Tug
APS and MPS helium will be loaded to 1100 psig concurrently with
the Tug APS propellant loading. Preloading in the TPF minimizes
operations at the pad during the critical final 10 hours before
launch. Four modifications were recommended to the baseline Tug
APS as shown in Figure 5-2 in para 4.2.
The final Tug APS/MPS pressurant loading is accomplished with
the Tug and spacecraft in the Orbiter bay starting at T-10 hours.
A recommended modification to the Tug APS helium system is to
increase the final pressure from 3000 psia to 3200 psia so that
both the APS and MPS helium systems can be loaded concurrently
from the same ground systems.
The Tug fuel cell will be serviced on-pad starting at T-10 hours
concurrently with servicing of the Orbiter fuel cells. The
proposed Orbiter fuel cell loading system was expanded to provide
Tug fuel cell servicing capability. It is recommended that the
Tug fuel cell reactant tanks are vacuum jacketed dewars with
density and temperature sensor probes.
The Tug MLI helium purge starts immediately after installation
of the Tug in the Orbiter bay, assuming the purge bag containing
a dry helium atmosphere is previously sealed. A design modifi-
cation in the form of a proposed MLI system configuration is
recommended.
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The Tug MPS cryogenics will be loaded concurrently with Shuttle ET
cryogenic loading within 75 minutes starting at T-2 hours. Load-
ing events were staggered so that flows will be started, changed,
or stopped in only one system at one time. Separate Tug and Shut-
tle cryogenic propellant loading systems are recommended so as to
eliminate pressure surges on the Tug from the Shuttle loading
system, to better control Tug propellant flow, and to minimize
Orbiter onboard weight.
Safety aspects of Tug propellant loading and servicing activities
were considered. The Auxiliary Propulsion System (APS) propellant
hydrazine (N2H 4), is stable in a contained system and allows the
APS to be loaded early in launch preparation. Two-step loading
of helium assures thermal stabilization and minimizes stresses
on the airborne tank during final loading. Loading events for
the cryogenic fuel cell and MPS loading were sequenced to avoid
simultaneous events occurring in different systems; either LH2
and LO 2, or Orbiter and Tug. Hazards in the Tug propellant
loading operations are known and are safety manageable.
4.0 DISCUSSION
------------------------------------------------------------------
4.1 TUG PROPELLANT OPERATIONS FLOW
The functions of Tug propellant loading have been extracted from
the overall Tug functional flow to provide visibility and conti-
nuity to propellant loading activities. The propellant loading
operations plan summary is shown in Figure 5-1 for a green
light, single cycle operation.
The ground operations on the Tug are predicted on the condition
of the Tug when it returns from a normal mission. A Special
Emphasis Assessment study on Tug safing requirements at post-
landing established the following philosophy.
1) Before Retrieval of Tug by Orbiter - Vent main propellants
down to approximately 2 psia. Venting hydrogen down to
approximately 1 psia in space ambient conditions may create
conditions where hydrogen can exist simultaneously as a
solid, liquid, or gas. (Triple point.)
2) After Retrieval of Tug by Orbiter but before Re-entry-- Secure
the APS (lock up any remaining quantities of APS propellant
and pressurant). Verify Tug/Orbiter fluid umbilicals are
reconnected. Vent fuel cell reactants.
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3) Tug Postlanding Propellant and Pressurant Potential Hazard
Status - The returning Tug contains chemical energy in the
form of residual hydrogen vapor in the propellant tank and
fuel cell reactant tank, and residual hydrazine in the APS
tank and lines. The returning Tug also contains pressure
energy in the main propellant tanks, fuel cell reactant tanks,
pressurization systems, and in the APS tank.
.2 TUG APS PROPELLANT LOADING
4.2.1 Function Description
The Tug APS system will be loaded with hydrazine in the Tug
Processing Facility (TPF) after checkout and before installation
in the Orbiter. The APS and MPS helium will be loaded to 1100
psig concurrently with APS propellant loading. The 1100 psig
pressure maintains a safety factor of >4.0 on the pressurant
system for subsequent handling.
Several alternative locations were considered for loading N 2H 4 .
These included loading in the Orbiter bay with the payload bay
doors closed, loading in the Orbiter bay with the payload bay
doors open, loading in the PCR, and loading in the TPF. Loading
N 2H 4 with the Tug in the payload bay or in the PCR offers the
advantage of operations flexibility in the case of payload
changeout with the disadvantage of operations complexity in the
final countdown.
The alternative of loading the N 2H 4 in the TPF was selected since
the loading could be done there without impacting the Orbiter
timeline and with maximum safety. Preloading of hydrazine in
the TPF minimizes the operations at the pad during the critical
final 10 hours before launch. This reduces operations complexity
and improves probability of launch success. Should a problem
develop in the TPF, the APS could still be loaded at the pad
since the APS servicing unit could be a mobile cart. The Tug APS
loading schematic and facility requirements are shown in Figure
5-2. Loading the APS requires approximately 1 hours as shown
in Figure 5-3.
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t Facility
. Requirements APS Propellant Supply and Transfer Unit 
Tug
Powerlow psia
n IndicatorPress Filter
Supply
150 psia Press
Nitrogen Reg
Supply Re
150 psia *F
Propellant
Fill
SFi Filter
N2H4 N2H4
100 Gal
Hydrazine
N2HL
Typ 24
Relief IPlaces
Gas Aspirator AA
(Vacuum Pump)
IientL. n
Figure 5-2 Tug APS Loading Schematic
Elapsed Time, minutes
Operational Sequence Time 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
t-1. Connect APS servicing unit to airborne 25
system and bleed-in hydrazine.
2. Pull vacuum on airborne propellant tank
outlet with nitrogen gas aspirator'
(25 to 30 mm Hg)
3. Load hydrazine at 3 gpm. 5
500 lb hydrazine (7.5 gal/ft 3)
62.9 lb/ft6 70°F = 59.6 gal
59.6 gal = 19.9 min
3 gpm
4. Disconnect APS servicing unit from airborne 20
system and verify no leakage
5. Total Time Allocated
Assumptions: The APS servicing unit has been leak This operation could be performed several
checked, flow meter calibration days before Tug APS loading.
verified, and loaded with approximately
100 gal hydrazine before Tug APS loading.
Figure 5-3 Tug APS Propellant Loading Timeline
-I
4.2.2 Recommended Modification
Several modifications are recommended to accommodate checkout and
servicing of the APS. These modifications are shown in Figure
5-4.
1) A servicing port is recommended between the series valves
ahead of each thruster to provide for functional and leak
check of each valve. This capability also provides an
effective way to purge the system and decontaminate as re-
quired without contaminating the catalyst bed of the thruster.
2) Solenoid valves, plus a quick disconnect and cap, are
recommended for pressurant servicing of the He sphere and
the N2H, bladder tanks (two places) to provide series iso-
lation at the servicing connections. The pressure regulator
in the ground servicing fill connection should be deleted.
3) Isolation valves are recommended between the helium storage
tank and the pressure regulators to accommodate concurrent
hydrazine and helium loading. During loading of the APS
propellant tanks, helium must first be applied to bottom the
bladder in the tank, then vented as the liquid displaces the
helium gas during fill. The isolation valves allow loading
of hydrazine and helium concurrently and the flight pres-
surization of the propellant tanks to be delayed until the
final count, or later.
4.3 TUG APS/MPS PRESSURANT LOADING
4.3.1 Function Description
The helium storage tank is prepressurized to 1100 psig to mini-
mize heating effect during final pressurization at the pad
caused by the heat of compression. The prepressurization will
assure thermal stabilization at the pad; thereby maximizing
helium loaded and minimizing stresses on the airborne storage
tank caused by pressure and temperature. An estimated thermal
stabilization rate is shown in Figure 5-5 for the two-step
loading, based on previous analysis and test of a similar system.
An estimated thermal stabilization rate for the helium storage
tank loaded in a single step function on the pad is also shown.
Such a loading would exceed the 4-hour time span allocated by
the Shuttle for Tug APS and pressurant servicing, but could be
accomplished within the 10 hours preceding launch.
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Figure 5-4 Tug APS Recommended Modifications
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Figure 5-5 Thermal Stabilization Rate for Helium Loading
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The airborne helium systems (MPS and APS) will be pressurized on
the launch pad from 1100 psig to 3200 psia during the 4-hour
period allowed for payload servicing commencing at T-10 hours.
Present requirements from the Baseline Space Tug Configuration
Definition document require 3200 psia for the MPS and 3000 psia
for the APS. Because both the APS and MPS helium systems must
be loaded concurrently, it is recommended that both systems be
loaded to the same pressure as discussed in para 4.3.2.
4.3.2 Recommended Modifications
Increase the pressure of the Tug APS helium system from 3000 psia
to 3200 psia. This change would allow both APS and MPS systems
to be loaded concurrently to the same pressure with a common
pressure control panel as shown in Figure 5-6. This minimizes
system and operations complexity and reduces cost by having only
one Tug ground helium pressurization system.
He i lveRelief 3200 3200
Valve
3200 psia APS* psia psia
Filter Vale
Cradle Orifice to
Disconnect Restrict
Pressurization3200 psia Rate
MPS
L02 T-0 Launch
-Space Tug Umbilical
r 
--------- 15000 Hand Loader 32001 5000 -T" zu
I psig psia
Valve iter Valve V alv e
Heli Storage 
F i e r
5000 psig I
Facility Pressure
Regulator
*Recommended Change From L---I
Baseline Design of 3000 psia Helium Pressure Control Plane
Launch Pad
Figure 5-6 Space Tug Helium Servicing Schematic
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The APS system was selected for change over the MPS since the
APS requires less helium and the impact caused by increased pres-
sure has a minimum impact on Tug performance because of the in-
creased tank weight to accommodate the higher pressure. The
higher pressure would also provide a contingency for the APS
helium requirement. If the APS storage tank and regulators are
selected from existing flight qualified hardware, there could be
no impact to accommodate the higher pressure.
4.4 TUG FUEL CELL REACTANT SERVICING
4.4.1 Function Description
The Tug fuel cells will be serviced on pad during the four hour
period allowed for payload servicing commencing at T-10 
hours.
The Tug is located in the Orbiter bay with the payload bay doors
open.
The cryogenic fluids are first serviced on the Orbiter by pres-
sure transfer from'the storage dewars through 1.5 inch diameter-
vacuum jacketed lines.. Following Orbiter servicing, the Tug
dewars will be loaded and pressurized. The LH2 and LO2 systems
provide simultaneous servicing of the Orbiter' vehicle 
fuel cell
dewars and the Tug vehicle fuel cell dewars. The servicing
approach is to initiate transfer on one system and verify no
leakage and proper operation before bringing up the other sys-
tem. A timeline with major events for servicing both the Orbiter
and Tug fuel cells is .shown in Figure 5-7.
It is assumed the Tug fuel cells will not be activated until
orbit is achieved and before Tug deployment. It may be possible
to pressurize the Tug dewars in orbit; however, heater power
considerations suggest that the Tug fuel cells dewars be pres-
surized on the ground.
4.4.2 Design Assumptions and Recommended Modifications
For servicing of the fuel cell reactant fluids, it is assumed that
the airborne tanks are double walled vacuum jacketed dewars
capable of storing 22 lb LH2 and 178 lb L02. It is also assumed
that the tanks have capacitance probes and, for loading purposes,
are similar to the Orbiter fuel cell dewars and those used on
Apollo.
From previous studies, a schematic of the proposed facility to
service the Orbiter fuel cells with LH2 is shown in Figure 5-8.
The L02 system is similar. This information, received from 
NASA
KSC, represents a new facility with the storage dewars located 
on
opposite 'corners of the service tower.at the 80-ft level on the
west side. Figure 5-8 presents the modifications required to
accommodate servicing the Tug from the same facility. Again,
modifications to the LO 2 system are similar.
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The mobile GSE used to service the Apollo fuel cells was also
considered; however, with slight modifications, the new facility
could accommodate both systems, requiring less maintenance and
operations with only one facility.
4.5 TUG MLI PURGE
4.5.1 Function Description
During prelaunch, ambient helium from ground supply is supplied
as soon as the Tug is installed in the orbiter to purge the MLI
which is contained in a purge bag. The helium is supplied as
soon as the Tug is installed in the orbiter at approximately
T-20 hr until launch. At liftoff, the purge is terminated and
the evacuation valves are opened to vent the insulation system.
Upon Orbiter reentry, the purge bag is repressurized from the
helium supply located on the Tug adapter.
The MLI purge vent is an addition to the T-0 umbilical panel
shown in the Payload Accommodations Document. The purge vent
may contain propellant vapors caused by stage leakage, and was
therefore not vented into the payload bay. Consideration was
given to dumping the MLI purge vent into the respective GO2 and
GH2 vents; however, during loading and topping of the main tanks,
a back pressure would be imposed on the purge bag. The bag, as
has been currently defined, is capable of only very low dif-
ferential pressure. The back pressure would require a higher
purge bag supply pressure that may be incompatible with the purge
bag capability.
Under normal ground turnaround operations, the MLI remains sealed
in the purge bag in a helium atmosphere. In the event this pro-
tection is removed and the MLI is exposed to ambient atmosphere,
it is necessary to redry it by means of a hot N2 purge cycle for
a period of time followed by a helium purge.
4.5.2 Recommended Modifications
The Multilayer Insulation (MLI) system for the main propulsion
LO2 and LH2 propellant tanks is assumed to be configured as
shown in Figure 5-9 with dedicated MLI purge vents.
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4.6 TUG MPS PROPELLANT LOADING
4.6.1 Function Description
The Tug main propellant system will be loaded with cryogenies
concurrently with the loading of the Shuttle cryogenics. This
will be accomplished on-pad with Shuttle loading starting at
T-2 hours and requiring 75 minutes for completion. Tug loading
will be accomplished within this time span as shown in Figure
5-10. The Tug loading sequence is dependent on the Shuttle
loading sequence and cannot be finalized until the Shuttle
loading sequence is totally defined. The Shuttle loading se-
quence shown is based on previous studies performed for NASA and
updated to reflect current design loading requirements of 75
minutes for the External Tanks.
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Figure 5-10 Simultaneous Shuttle/Tug Propellant Loading
The Tug loading sequence is arranged such that the Tug flow
starts after Shuttle flow is initiated and stops before the
Shuttle flow is terminated. Each event for Shuttle and Tug
loading is scheduled so as not to happen simultaneously with
another loading event. This will provide maximum operational
visibility and maximize the safety considerations.
4.6.2 Design Assumptions
The propellant loading system shown in Figure 5-11 was assumed
for the purpose of this study. It is based on recommendations
from a previous NASA funded study.* The system shown is for
liquid oxygen. The liquid hydrogen system would be similar.
*Report No. GDCA-BN273-003, "Space Tug Launch Site Service
Interface Study"
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Figure 5-11 Liquid Oxygen Storage and Transfer System
It is assumed that separate Shuttle and Tug cryogenic propellant
loading systems will be used based on the following considerations:
1) Pressure surges in the Shuttle loading system will not be
imposed on the Tug MPS.
2) Propellant flow can be controlled better for the Tug.
3) Less onboard weight penalty with fewer vehicle components
and accessibility requirements.
4.7 TUG FLUID SERVICING PANEL(S) REQUIREMENT
4.7..1 General Description
From the Space Shuttle System Payload Accommodations Document
Volume XIV Rev C, fluid and electrical services for the cryogenic
Tug are provided by GSE through the T-0 launch umbilicals and the
payload umbilical. As stated in the above document (page 5-3),
"Ground services required to preclude a hazardous condition or to
safe the payload, in the event of launch abort is required sub-
sequent to T-4 hours, shall be assigned to the T-0 launch um-
bilical panel. Ground services required up to T-4 hours shall
be assigned to the prelaunch umbilical." From the standpoint of
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of timelines, the fuel cell could be serviced through the pre-
launch umbilical; however, this would place both the L02 and LH2dewar servicing through the same panel. For safety considera-
tions, it is desirable to separate L02 and LH2 servicing panels
as provided by the T-0 launch umbilicals.
4.7.2 Recommended Modifications
Add provisions to the T-0 launch panels (not currently shown in
the Payload Accommodations Document) to provide for fuel cell
servicing and for MLI purge. The service requirements for the
T-0 launch umbilicals to accommodate the cryogenic Tug are shown
in Figure 5-12.
Fuel Cell Supply (Added) Fuel Cell Supply (Added)
Fuel Cell Vent (Added) Fuel Cell Vent (Added)
LH 2 Fill & Drain L02 Fill & Drain
GH2 Vent G02 Vent
MLI Purge Vent (Added) Amb He Fill & MLI Purge Supply
LH2 T-0 Launch Umbilical
L0 2 T-0 Launch Umbilical
Figure 5-12 Recommended T-0 Launch UmbilicaZ Panels
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
-------------------------------------------------------
The purpose of this study is to determine the Tug cleanliness re-
quirements during ground processing of the Tug at the launch site.
As part of this study, a specific recommendation will be made as
to whether the Tug should be first cleaned in a 100K class clean
room before refurbishment and checkout and then processed in this
environment, or if it should be refurbished and checked out in a
controlled factory environment and then cleaned just before mating
with a spacecraft, or placed in the payload canister.
The steps required for normal Tug refurbishment and checkout in-
clude:
1) inspection and checkout to the line replaceable unit level;
2) required structural rework;
3) optical check for structural alignment;
4) line replaceable unit removal and replacement;
5) cleaning operations; and
6) storage of Tug until mission assignment.
2.0 GENERAL TUG CLEANLINESS COMPATIBILITY
------------------------------------------------------------------
2.1 TUG CLEANING
A visibly clean Tug will be cleaned by a gross cleaning process.
Gross cleaning will remove contaminants such as weld and heat
treat scale, corrosion, oxide films, oils, grease, shop soil,
fuel and carbon deposits, residue from burned surfaces, loose
particulate, and deposition from outgassing. This type of clean-
ing is considered a normal shop process and usually does not re-
quire special environmental controls, packaging, handling, or
storage beyond accepted good practice that will not degrade the
quality of the Tug.
The following types of cleaners will be used for removing gross
forms of contamination:
1) acid cleaners,
2) alkaline cleaners,
3) mild alkaline cleaners and detergents,
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4) organic solvent cleaners,
5) tap water and deionized water,
6) neutralizing and passivating solutions,
7) mechanical cleaning.
The specific cleaner used and method of cleaning will be specified
in detailed cleaning procedures to be prepared at a later date.
2.2 COMPATIBILITY WITH ORBITER PAYLOAD BAY
The Orbiter payload bay will be visibly cleaned and purged in ac-
cordance with NASA Requirement Document JSC 07700 Volume XIV before
loading a payload. This cleanliness condition is equivalent to a
class 100K clean room. Specifically, the internal surfaces of the
payload bay envelope will be cleaned to a visibly clean level as
defined in JSC Specification SN-C-0005. (Visibly clean is defined
as the absence of all particulate and nonparticulate visible to
the normal unaided, except corrected vision, eye. Particulate is
identified as matter of miniature size with observable length,
width, and thickness. Nonparticulate is film matter without def-
inite dimensions.) In addition, the payload bay will be contin-
uously purged with nominally class 100, guaranteed class 5000
(HEPA filtered) air per FED-STD-209B, which will contain less than
15 parts per million hydrocarbons, based on methane equivalent.
The air within the enclosure will be maintained at 70 ± 50 and
45 + 5% relative humidity. This condition will be maintained through
payload loading and all subsequent launch preparation operations.
The level of cleanliness maintained at preflight on the payload
and payload bay will be retained through launch and orbital inser-
tion. By visibly cleaning the Tug surfaces to the level specified
in JSC Specification SN-C-0005, the Tug cleanliness will be com-
patible with the prelaunch cleanliness conditions of the Orbiter
payload bay area, and therefore will not degrade its cleanliness.
2.3 COMPATIBILITY WITH SPACECRAFT
The purpose of the Tug is to place designated spacecraft in spe-
cific orbits and retrieve certain ones for return to the Orbiter.
It is a requirement in performing this mission that the Tug not
contaminate the various spacecraft causing degradation of perfor-
mance ability to meet mission objectives. Table 6-1 shows a com-
pilation of Tug related payloads having specific cleanliness class
requirements. It is noted that 17 (the majority of these payloads)
are of the 100,000 (100K) class, which is the same cleanliness
level environment specified for the Orbiter payload bay.
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Table 6-1
Tug Spacecraft Cleanliness
Requirements
Spacecraft
Cleanliness Number of
Level Spacecraft
100K 17
10K 5
5K 1
1K 1
500 2.
Unknown 17
It should be pointed out that this cleanliness specification
(100K class clean room) does not relate per se to how clean a pay-
load is. The specification states that there will be a maximum
allowable number of airborne particles per unit volume 0.5 micron
and larger, or 5.0 microns and larger at a location that will
yield the particle count of the air as it approaches a specific
"work" location. For example, for a class 100K environment, the
particle count cannot exceed a total of 100K particles per cubic
foot of a size 0.5 micron and larger, or 700 particles per cubic
foot of a size 5.0 microns and larger. However, this particle
requirement does limit the number and size of particulate that
could possibly be deposited on a critical surface such as an op-
tical surface, spectrographic slits, or contaminant-sensitive
component such as an IR detector.
Other particulate contamination concerns of spacecraft are elec-
tromagnetic wave scattering, absorption, and emission character-
istics of these particles.
For those payloads whose particulate contamination conditions
must be controlled to more stringent tolerances than the class
100K level, for example, to air cleanliness classes of 10,000 or
100, the payload contractors will have to provide necessary
cleanliness protection, such as protective shrouds.
The Tug will be in compliance with the class 100K environment when
visibly cleaned to JSC Specification SN-C-0005.
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2.4 SELF-GENERATED CONTAMINATION CONTROL REQUIREMENTS
Contamination control of the Tug and its support equipment (SE)
that will be contained in the Orbiter payload bay will be cleaned
to meet the required cleanliness condition of the payload bay
(100K class equivalent). This procedure includes cleaning all
visibly loose contaminants in the Tug, visibly cleaning all sur-
faces, control of contamination from material outgassing (per NASA
Specification SP-R-0022), propellant leakage, mechanical systems
operation, and venting of consumables used by the Tug. During
flight operations, the Tug main propulsion system and APS exhaust
should be constrained not to impinge or be reflected upon the
spacecraft, Orbiter, or mission-peculiar equipment.
By cleaning the Tug to a visibly clean condition and incorporat-
ing the previously listed constraints, no contamination control
problem for the Orbiter payload bay or spacecraft resulting from
Tug flights is envisioned.
3.0 CORRELATION OF TUG CLEANLINESS WITH 100K CLASS CLEAN ROOM
----------------------------------------------------------------
The correlation between a visibly clean surface and a clean room
class is not directly or measurably related. As discussed prev-
iously, a clean room class measurement is the number of particles
of a specific size in a specific volume (ft 3 or m 3) measured be-
tween the HEPA filter air inlet and the approach to a specified
work location.
If the surface of a Tug is visibly clean, there is less chance
for particulate to be left on it to be sloughed off later by per-
sonnel brushing it or by air currents picking it up, with both
type actions generating increased contamination in the air. It
should be noted, however, that even in a class 100K clean room
environment, after a given time particulates will settle-out on
surfaces; therefore, all flight hardware should be covered if
left in the clean room for an extended period of time.
In summary, a visibly clean Tug will not increase the amount of
particulate in a 100K clean room.
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4.0 REFURBISHMENT LOCATION AND TIME REQUIREMENTS
----------------------------------------------------------------
The basic question of this study is to determine when and where,
during the ground refurbishment process, the Tug should be cleaned.
Should it be refurbished in a factory environment in an as re-
ceived condition (just returned from a flight mission or as received
from the Tug contractor), and then cleaned to the required clean-
liness specifications just before mating with a spacecraft or can-
siter, or should it be cleaned first, then processed in a class 100K
clean room, and continuously maintained in that environment through
prelaunch activities?
4.1 FACTORY CLEANING VERSUS 100K CLEAN ROOM
Based on our Viking experience, it has been estimated that about
a 30% saving in time can be made in refurbishing and checking out
an assembly such as a Tug in a factory controlled environment,
compared to a class 100K clean room. It must be emphasized that
to go the factory checkout route, clean room type cleanliness
around the assembly is sacrificed. However, cleanliness criteria
for the Tug per se are not stringent.
In general, both assembly areas will require the same cleanliness
discipline such as continuous contamination cleanup, but obviously
the class 100K clean room will require more stringent cleanliness
procedures.
A summary of the items and functions required for the class 100K
environment that make up the 30% longer time for a Tug refurbish-
ment operation as presented in Figure 6-1.
Training Equipment & Tools
Materials
Increase in Span
Personnel Contamination Clean Room Maienance Parts, Material, Supplies
Figure 6-1 Refurbishment Location and Time
Requirements
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4.1.1 Materials
Cleaning fluids, detergent liquid, sponges, wipers, and gases are
controlled to specifications.
4.1.2 Equipment and Tools
Portable and installed equipment used in the clean room will be
maintained to a specific cleanliness level. The following equip-
ment is normally required for maintenance and operational func-
tions in the clean room.
4.1.2.1 CZeaning Equipment - Stainless steel waste receptacles
and mop buckets, aluminum step ladders, gelatin (T190R52) floor
mats, vacuum cleaner with HEPA filter or equivalent, or vacuum
cleaning capability with discharge outside of the clean room.
4.1.2.2 Equipment and TooZs - Equipment and tools will be main-
tained to a specific cleanliness level in the clean room. The use
of lubricant will be held to a minimum and only approved types
will be used. Cleaning of tools and equipment will be accomplished
by wiping with a special clean wiper dampened with a specific sol-
vent and/or followed by vacuum cleaning.
Equipment and tools brought into the clean room through the ve-
hicle airlock entryway will be cleaned in the following manner:
1) The item will be blown with filtered air or nitrogen at 30 psi
maximum before being brought into the air lock. Contamina-
tions visible after this process will be removed by solvent
cleaning (brush or wipe) or abrasive cleaning (wire brushing,
etc) followed by repeat air blast cleaning.
2) Once entered into the vehicle airlock entryway, the item will
be wiped with a clean wiper dampened with solvent followed by
complete and thorough vacuum cleaning.
3) The item and vehicle entryway will be free of visible contami-
nation before the inner door to clean room is opened. This
operation is time consuming.
4.1.3 Personnel
Personnel are a major source of contamination in a clean room.
To reduce this source of contamination to the maximum extent pos-
sible, specific features are provided.
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To enter a clean room personnel must first enter a clothes chang-
ing room and then proceed through an air lock. Clothing required
for use in a clean room includes coveralls, boots, hoods and caps,
and gloves. Personnel before entering the clean room change area
will remove sweaters, coats, hats, and other types of severe
weather clothing or footwear. Shoes will be free of obvious vis-
ible contamination (mud, grease, etc).
Personnel upon entering the clean room change area will vacuum
their clothes and don clean room clothing except boots. Boots
will be donned in the airlock area.
Personnel leaving the clean room will remove their boots in the
airlock area and their coveralls, gloves, and head cover in the
change area. Coveralls and head covers shall be placed in a poly-
ethylene bag; shoe covers in a separate polyethylene bag. Person-
nel normally assigned to the area will store their bagged cloth-
ing in their locker.
Since personnel enter and leave a clean room several times a day
(at the start of the day, mid morning break, lunch break, mid-
afternoon break, and unscheduled exits), a considerable amount
of time is consumed in clothes changing.
4.1.4 Parts, Materials and Supplies
Parts, materials, instruments, or supplies will be contained
within an acceptable clean room covering made of nonfriable, inert
plastic or corrosion resistant material before entry into the
clean room. Outer surface of wrapping or covering will be vacuum
cleaned before entry.
Paper and paper products (other than approved clean room paper)
required for clean room operations will be contained in a suit-
able container or covered by plastic film when not being used.
Cleaned parts scheduled for entry into the clean room and trans-
ported in protective containers or coverings to avoid physical
damage, will be removed from the protective media when inside the
clean room entryway. If it is necessary for a container to enter
the clean room, the outer surfaces of the container will be sol-
vent wiped and/or vacuum cleaned before entry into the clean room.
Any fabrication operation that generates harmful contamination
will be performed according to specific procedures.
4.1.5 Clean Room Maintenance Requirements
All surfaces of the clean room area will be maintained in a us-
ually clean condition.
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Specific daily and weekly maintenance activities will be performed
in accordance with specific procedures.
Personnel working in the clean room will maintain the cleanliness
level of their immediate work area and work surfaces by progres-
sively removing contamination as generated or observed. Cleaning
will be accomplished by using a clean cloth or sponge followed by
a dry cloth wipe and/or vacuum cleaning.
Maintenance personnel are required to be on duty at all times work
is being accomplished in the clean room.
4.1.6 Personnel Training
Personnel selected to work in a clean room must be trained for
the job. The following factors will be considered in training:
1) Indoctrination must include a thorough acquaintance with the
clean room rules, regulations, and procedures.
2) An explanation of the reasons for these stringent regulations
must be given.
3) Both individual and team training should be conducted in a
simulated clean room.
4) It is advisable that indoctrination and training be extended
not only to the immediate level of supervision of the clean
room operators but to the next higher level.
NASA has prescribed a minimum course of instruction for all per-
sonnel whose activities may bring them in contact with contamina-
tion-sensitive articles.
Although a time and motion study has not been conducted on the
Viking class 100K clean room to compare the difference in time
between test and checkout in this facility versus a controlled
factory, it is thought that the 30% value is reasonable. TPF
processing time shown in subplan III-A stick-and-ball does not
take into consideration this 30% factor, and would increase from
93 to 124 hours. The factory clean stick-and-ball (Fig. 6-2)
shows TPF time of 93 hours.
Another consideration in deciding where to conduct cleaning of the
Tug and its support equipment (SE) is the availability of clean
room space versus number of Tugs and spacecraft to be processed
at one time. Since clean room space is limited, it is economi-
cally advantageous to refurbish the Tug and SE in a controlled
factory area and clean it there just before its integration with
the spacecraft. In addition to providing more space for space-
craft preparation, cleaning the Tug in the factory area will re-
duce contamination maintenance in the clean room facility and pro-
tect other spacecraft located in the clean facility.
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Examples of contamination particulate sources encountered during
the refurbishment process include release of particles lodged in
cracks when the access panels are removed, structural rework, in-
spection and checkout to the line replaceable unit level, and re-
moval and replacement of line replaceable units. In addition, it
is probable that paint in the vicinity of the APS and main engine
will have blistered during engine firing operations and be subject
to spalling or be sloughed off by workmen brushing against the
surfaces during refurbishment.
Additional reasons why the Tug should not be cleaned in the clean
room include:
1) tools and fixtures used for Tug refurbishment would not have
to be cleaned to a clean room condition;
2) removing outgassing deposition on the external surface of the
Tug could be a complex operation requiring large use of sol-
vents and abrasive materials that would not be compatible with
a clean room;
3) contaminated thermal control paint removal could require
scraping, sanding, or other processes not compatible with main-
taining a clean room environment.
These examples and others are contained in Table 6-2 which is a
matrix showing the most probable contamination sources the Tug
could encounter, and the recommended location for cleaning during
the Tug ground processing.
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Table 6-2 Comparison of Tug Cleaning in Factory vs Class 1OOK Clean Room
I' Preferred Cleaning Location
Contamination Source Factory (Controlled Area) Class 100K Clean Room
1. Residual Contamination from Chips, metal filings, etc that vibrate out Chips, metal filings, etc that vibrate out
Fabrication could be removed at either location could be removed at either location
2. Suspended Contaminant Affecting:
a) Tools, Fixtures, Work Sur- Could be vacuumed and wiped down more easily Would require high maintenance effort/clean
faces room procedures
b) Fallout Impingement Air inherently cleaner due to clean room fil-
tering
3. Personnel Generated Could be minimized Area inherently cleaner due to clean room pro-
cedures
4. Work Generated Debris generated would be the same at either Debris generated would be the same at either
location location
5. Tug Self-Generated Debris generated would be the same at either Debris generated would be the same at either
location location
6. Flight Environment
a) Payload Bay Particulate Contamination removed more efficiently with-
Ingestion out clean room procedure restriction
b) Orbiter RCS and VCS Dirty operation requiring scraping and sand-
Impingement ing plus special solvents and repaint
c) Tug APS/Main Engine Dirty operation requiring scraping and sand-
Impingement ing plus special solvents and repaint
d) Outgassing Deposition areas that could require scrap-
ing, sanding, etc plus special solvent and
repaint
e) Thermal Paint UV Degrada- Dark paint areas that could require scraping,
tion sanding and repaint
7. Anomaly/Repair
a) Mechanical Contaminant removed more efficiently without
clean room procedure restrictions
b) Hydraulic Contaminant removed more efficiently without
clean room procedure restrictions
c) Electrical Contaminant removed more efficiently without
clean room procedure restrictions
d) Structural Contaminant removed more efficiently without
clean room procedure restrictions
5.0 TUG PROGRAM CONTAMINATLON CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS
5.1 DESIGN DEVELOPMENT/REFURBISHMENT
To eliminate contamination that might constitute a hazard or in-
terfere with the operational phase of the Tug or spacecraft, con-
tamination control is considered at the 'rug design/development
stage. All too often, contamination control procedures are not
developed until after a failure or degradation of data has taken
place. At this stage, design/development features are very costly
to be incorporated into the design. Those features to be consid-
ered are:
1) minimize or eliminate sources of contaminant generation. An
example is the selection of nonmetallic materials for the Tug
in accordance with NASA Specification SP-R-0022 to minimize
the effects of offgassing and outgassing;
2) render the Tug least susceptible to contamination;
3) facilitate contamination removal and monitoring during manu-
facturing and later cyclic refurbishment of the Tug.
To develop an effective contamination control design, the Tug de-
signer must be aware of more than just the function and reliabil-
ity requirements; he must also be aware of the following factors
of the total Tug life:
1) Cleanliness requirements;
2) Manufacturing/refurbishment and processing environments;
3) ManufacturIng/refurbishment processes;
4) Test procedures and equipment;
5) Operational use and storage conditions.
A further breakdown of design/development considerations for Tug
contamination control follows:
1) Materials - All nonmetallic materials used on the Tug should
be selected in accordance with NASA Specification SP-R-0022
to control outgassing. All materials should be selected based
on contamination control including corrosion, wear products,
shedding, and flaking.
2) Configuration - Consideration should be given to accessibil-
ity to surfaces and sensitive areas, mating of materials, gen-
eration of contaminants, and protection of parts for contami-
nation control.
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3) Fabrication - During the fabrication process, the following
contamination control concerns should be considered:
a) Casting residues and entrapped gases;
b) Molding flash, residue, and mold wear products;
c) Forming, drawing and extrusion burrs, lubricants, release
of compounds, particles, and scales;
d) Machining burrs and chips, capillary traps, coolants, and
cutting oils;
e) Chemical milling etch residue;
f) Plating scale, flaking, and residue;
g) Heat treat scale, silica, and liquids;
h) Cleaning effects on material, drying, and residue;
I) Polishing oils, polishing compounds, chemical residue,
dust, and oxides;
j) Tools, equipment, and personnel causing dirt and oil de-
posits, product wear, personnel contaminants, and air-
borne contaminants.
4) Assembly Processes - During assembly and recycle refurbishment
the following contamination control concerns should be consid-
ered:
a) Migration and transfer of contaminants from mating assem-
blies, tools-jigs-fixtures, work surfaces, personnel and
environment during product flow and assembly sequence;
b) Generation of fragments, chips, shedding, flux residue,
fumes, and oxides due to fastener operations (riveting,
bolting, and welding).
5) Test and Inspection 
- Generation of flaking, shedding, oil,
dirt, and abrasion products caused by the use of test equip-
ment and fixtures.
6) Storage 
- Packaging considerations should include the proper
selection of containers, wrapping materials, cushioning mate-
rials, desiccants, and barriers. Environmental considera-
tions should include temperature, humidity, pressure, shock,
and vibration.
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An absolute measurement or definition of the degree of cleanli-
ness required for a specific case is frequently impracticable or
Impossible. The a;ternative Is to establLsh minimum product per-
formance levels. Performance levels can be developed for:
1) product Lon processes;
2) appropriate levels of assembly of products;
3) controlled areas and facilities (not necessarily clean rooms);
4) cleaning methods;
5) finished products;
6) other activities where indication of a cleanliness level is
required.
If performance levels are established in lieu of cleanliness lev-
els, they must be commensurate with the performance requirements
of the Tug. Control methods and monitoring techniques must be
employed to maintain uniform and consistent operations, and to as-
sure adequate levels of contamination control, at all times. These
control methods and monitoring techniques will be delineated in
the 'rTug refurbishment contamination control plan.
5.2 ON-ORBIT OPEI'ATIONS
The major source of on-orbit contamination to the payload is the
Orbiter. Orbiter vents and filters must be designed to minimize
deposition and particulate contamination for launch and reentry.
Vent closing and opening must also be timelined to minimize con-
taminant ingestion.
The Tug main engine and APS produce little or no contaminant by-
products. The Orbiter RCS and VCS produce MIDI nitrate, which is
a brown, viscous material that can contaminate the spacecraft and
Tug thermal control surfaces. Maximum use of the APS and minimum
use of the Orbiter RCS and VCS should be programmed for Tug de-
ployment and retrieval during mission operations.
Spacecraft developers requiring areas cleaner than class 100K
around their spacecrafts will be responsible for the provisions
of this environment for all phases of the mission including Or-
biter prelaunch and launch and Tug operations.
Both active and passive thermal control systems will be used on
the Tug. Based on a Tug mission duration of five days for up to
20 missions, the white thermal control paint could turn brown be-
cause of contaminant deposition and high energy radiation. Re-
furbishment of the thermal control surfaces will be required on a
schedule compatible with the thermal control design considerations.
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Dumping liquids overboard from the Orbiter should be timelined
so as not to contaminate the spacecraft or the Orbiter.
Although the exhaust products of both the Tug main engine and the
APS are not contaminants, surface areas in the vicinities of the
engine nozzles will surface blister and spall when the engines
are fired.
Surface material selection shobuld be carefully considered and
either cleaning or replacement of these surfaces should be pro-
grammed into the refurbishment cycle on a scheduled basis.
Another area of particulate contamination control that should be
addressed during cleaning in the refurbishment cycle is the re-
moval of that contamination that was trapped in areas inaccessible
for cleaning during fabrication, but which may become accessible
after flight because of vibration of the Tug. If not removed, this
material could possibly shake out during flight operations and de-
pending on where it exits from the Tug, could possibly lodge on the
spacecraft where it could degrade its operational performance.
5.3 ANOMALY IMPACT ON TUC CLEANLINESS REQUIREMENTS
Based on multiuse of the Tug for orbital missions, a sizeable
maintenance program with inherent contamination problems accom-
panying these operations could occur. Examples of Tug system
anomalies that could cause contamination of the Tug include:
1) hydraulic system leaks and spills;
2) coolant system leaks and spills;
3) propulsion system leaks and spills;
4) pneumatic system leaks;
5) line replaceable units failures requiring major rework.
Flight operations that could affect Tug cleanliness requirements
include rendezvous contamination from the Orbiter during deploy-
ment and retrieval. Orbiter launch and reentry payload bay con-
taminant ingestion could occur during launch when the SRBs are
staged which could cause an external positive pressure surge to
blanket the payload bay vents with the possibility of forcing some
contaminants into the payload bay. During reentry, the payload
bay vents are actively controlled and are closed during the highly
contaminating phase of reentry. However, contaminants lodged at
the inlets of the vents or in the vicinity of the vents during
this phase of the Orbiter reentry could be forced in and deposited
on the Tug.
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These types of anomalies and contamination conditions could be of
such a major consequence that it may be impractical to process
them in a class 100K clean room environment.
6.0 FUNCTION FLOW
6.1 RESOURCE REQUIREMENT DELTA
The Tug ground operations flow is shown in Figure 6-3. This flow
identifies the operations required for processing the Tug in a
"factory clean environment." The operations are essentially the
same as those required for "1()OK clean processing" which are iden-
tified in subplan A. The highlighted areas identify changes from
the "lOOK clean" processing flow.
Function Description 0Data Sheets have been prepared for each of
the new/modified functions and are contained in Appendix A.
There were no changes to GSE, software, or maintenance require-
ment data sheets because of processing in the factory clean en-
vironment.
The Facility Requirement Data sheets change by removing the re-
quirement to process in a 100K environment. One additional facil-
ity requirement was identified and that was a 100K equivalent
clean room to support spacecraft integration and checkout.
The cost comparison of activating a 100K clean or a factory clean
processing facility is contained in subplan D, Tug Site Activa-
tion. These figures show that it is cost effective to process
in a factory clean environment. In addition, analysis of the
stick-and-ball chart shows that the time required to accomplish
functions are the same; however, our Viking experience has shown
cleanliness procedures add 30% to the operation's time. This 30%
increase would add 31 hours to time in TPF for 100K processing.
6.2 MINIMUM CLEANING OF TUG
By definition a 100K class clean room facility contains no more
than 100K particles over 0.5 microns and 700 particles greater
than 5.0 microns in a cubic foot volume measured as the air ap-
proaches a specific work area during work activity. A visibly
clean Tug when placed in a 100K classclean room will not degrade
its cleanliness level if particles are not generated from the Tug
because of personnel working on it. More specifically, if no
skin panels or covers are removed and the Tug is not rotated or
shaken while in the payload clean room, the Tug will not increase
the particulate count in the air of the clean room. From a prac-
tical standpoint, some particulate will be generated during the
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attachment of the Tug to the spacecraft and the connecting and
disconnecting of integration test cabling. By the enforcement of
contamination control discipline during these operations, partic-
ulate generation can be minimized to not compromise the clean
room standards. Therefore, if required, the Tug could be mated
and the Tug/spacecraft checked out in the spacecraft facility.
During prelaunch and postlaunch activities when the Tug and space-
craft are in the Orbiter payload bay in an equivalent 100K clean
room environment, the area around the spacecraft should remain at
the 100K cleanliness level even though some particulates might
possibly sift out from the Tug. This clean condition should ex-
ist for the spacecraft because of the purge geometry and cleanli-
ness level. The continuous purge of nominal class 100, guaranteed
class 5000 (HEPA filtered) air into the payload bay will be moving
from the front of the payload bay back over, first the spacecraft
and then the Tug after which It is exhausted out the aft end of
the payload bay.
6.3 POSTLANDING OPERATIONS
After the Orbiter lands, the payload bay clean air purge will com-
mence as soon as the purge syst-em-can-b-e-conected-o-t--e-Orb-bier
(30 min). The Orbiter will be allowed to cool down for approxi-
mately 2 hours before it will be taken inside the Orbiter Process-
ing Facility (OPF). Approximately 15 hours later, the payload bay
doors will be opened and the payload removed from the Orbiter.
Depending on the contamination sensitivity of the payload, clean-
liness handling precautions, including use of portable clean rooms
for payloads requiring this type handling, will be observed. For
Tug payloads, the Tug will be disassembled from the spacecraft in
the OPF and transported to the Tug Processing Facility for refur-
bishment processing.
The cleanliness condition of the Tug after return from flight will
be dependent on launch, on-orbit and reentry and unloading con-
tamination levels. In addition, self-contamination will probably
have occurred because of paint blistering and spalling around the
engine exhaust areas, particulates shaken out from areas that were
inaccessible for prelaunch cleaning, and from possible fluid leaks
from Tug operational systems.
Different levels of maintenance activities will be scheduled for
the returned Tug dependent on the number of hours (missions) it
has been operated, new modification kits to be installed, and op-
erational malfunctions requiring repair. Some operations could
cause excessive contamination of the area around the Tug and, if
in a "clean room," could cause the clean room to be shut down for
cleaning.
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7.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
----------------------------------------------------
7.1 CONCLUSIONS
7.1.1 Compatibility with Orbiter Payload Bay
By visibly cleaning the Tug surfaces to the level specified in
JSC Specification SN-C-0005, the Tug cleanliness will be compat-
ible with the prelaunch cleanliness conditions of the Orbiter
payload bay area and therefore will not degrade its cleanliness.
7.1.2 Compatibility with Spacecraft
When visibly clean, the Tug will be considered to be compatible
with the Class 100K clean spacecraft. For those spacecraft requir-
ing a more stringently controlled environment than Class 100K
cleanliness, the spacecraft contractor will be responsible for fur-
nishing the clean room condition by furnishing a portable clean
room, shroud or bag.
7.1.3 Self-Imposed Contamination
By designing in contamination cleaning features such as cleaning
accessibility, selection of materials to reduce outgassing and
imposing flight constraints, such as nonimpingement of engine
plumes on the payload and visibly cleaning, no contamination con-
trol to the spacecraft and Orbiter payload bay is envisioned as
a result of flying the Tug.
7.1.4 Refurbishment Location and Time
Our Viking experience has shown that it will take about 30% longer
to refurbish the Tug in a class 100 clean room.
7.1.5 Contamination Control Constraints
At the start of Tug design/development, consideration must be
given to contamination control. Operational contamination con-
trol constraints must be imposed to reduce contamination to the
payload and Orbiter and to reduce ground refurbishment cleaning
operations.
7.1.6 Anomaly Impact on Tug Contamination Control
Based on multiuse of the Tug for orbital missions, a sizeable
maintenance program with inherent contamination problems accom-
panying these operations could occur. These contamination condi-
tions could be of severe enough magnitude that cleaning opera-
tions in a clean room would be costly and time consuming.
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7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
The Tug is not critically sensitive to contamination with excep-
tion of specific components such as the star tracker that could
be protected locally. In addition, since clean room facility
space and refurbishment time will be at a premium, it is recom-
mended that the Tug be cleaned and refurbished in a controlled
factory facility.
This factory type facility should be designed with a view toward
high standards of shop cleanliness such as "slick" surface floors,
walls, and ceilings where particulate cannot settle and later re-
circulate due to work activities and air circulation. Extensive
janitorial help should be provided during work activities to re-
move any accumulated contamination. All work personnel should be
trained and disciplined (in accordance with a Ground Contamina-
tion Control Plan) to clean up any contaminant they generate dur-
ing specific refurbishment activities.
7.2.1 Tug Wipe Down
It is recommended that the Tug external surface be wiped down as
soon as it is brought into the factory-type refurbishment facil-
ity so that particulates will not fall into the Tug when panels
and doors are removed for maintenance. This cleaning activity
will reduce particulates in the vicinity of the Tug because of
personnel and support equipment rubbing against the Tug during
work activities.
During the refurbishment activities as specific maintenance work
is accomplished inside the Tug, the personnel accomplishing the
work should vacuum the area and, where visible contaminants can
still be seen, wipe the area down in accordance with prescribed
procedures contained in the Contamination Control Plan. At com-
pletion of the refurbishment process, the accessible internal
compartments of the Tug should be inspected for contamination.
If contamination is evident, it should be removed in accordance
with prescribed cleaning procedures. Following the internal in-
spection, the Tug should have the external surface cleaned to a
visibly clean condition in accordance with prescribed procedures.
The Tug should then be enclosed in a protective bag, placed in a
temperature and humidity controlled environment for storage.
7.2.2 Spacecraft Mate
It is recommended that the spacecraft be mated with the Tug in
the factory controlled area. The spacecraft should be placed in
an equivalent class 100K clean room for Tug to spacecraft integra-
tion and checkout. This room, which would be above the Tug, would
have a circular removable door in its floor that could be removed
for the mating operation. A seal would be located around the
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periphery of the door opening to assure maintaining the clean en-
vironment of the enclosure. Immediately on completion of integra-
tion and checkout, separate environmental covering should beplaced over both the spacecraft and Tug for movement of the pay-
load to the final Tug cleaning location.
An alternative would be to move the Tug into the clean payload
launch preparation area for integration and checkout activities
with the spacecraft. Since there will have been no air stringent(HIEPA filter) particulate control in the factory environment, afinal wipe down of the external surface of the Tug should be ac-
complished after the Tug is unbagged in the payload clean room
and before its integration with the spacecraft.
7.2.3 Contamination Control Plan
A Contamination Control Plan for cleaning and maintaining clean-liness during the ground processing of the Tug is necessary forthe program. Without a specific plan, a cleanliness discipline
could not be maintained to keep the Tug clean after its cleaningoperation and from degrading the cleanliness of other hardware
during prelaunch, launch, and on-orbit operations. An outlinefor a Contamination Control Plan to minimize contamination duringthe Tug ground processing operations follows.
1) Design Requirements 
- Determine cleanliness level and sensi-
tivity of product. Prescribe contamination limits by design
drawings or specifications.
2) Product Design Review 
- Review the design of the assembliesin terms of contamination sensitivity and ease of cleaning
during the ground refurbishment cycle.
3) Processes and Controls 
- Develop processes and controls to
ensure cleanliness of the product and its support equipmentduring manufacture of parts, components, assemblies, and
materials.
4) Subtier Contractors 
- Outline method for imposing contamina-
tion control requirements.
5) Quality Control 
- Detail and comply with QC procedures, sam-pling plans, etc.
6) Product Protection 
- Provide method for product protection to
maintain required cleanliness level.
7) Personnel 
- Outline methods for personnel training, motiva-
tion and control.
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8) Post Mate - Specify procedures for checkout, storage, trans-
port, and installation of the payload with the Orbiter to as-
sure maintenance of the required cleanliness control.
7.2.4 Factory Clean Canister
Perform trade study to determine feasibility of transport Tug/
spacecraft to launch pad in a factory clean canister.
7.2.5 Multiple Tug Cleaning
Perform a study to drive out problems associated with cleaning
the Tug up to 20 times in support of the Tug missions.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
----------------------------------------------------------------
Since the summer of 1973, the predicted Tug traffic from WTR has
progressively dwindled as shown in the recent WTR Tug traffic
evolution presented in Table 7-1. The current W'R traffic is
one or two launches per year.
Table 7-1 WTR Tug Traffic Evolution
84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91
Summer 73
NASA 4 6 4 6 4 6 4 --
DOD 9 7 13 8 12 8 8 --
Total 13 13 17 14 16 14 12 --
January 74
NASA 4 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
DOD 4 5 4 4 3 5 3 5
Total 8 6 5 6 5 7 5 7
March 74
NASA 4 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
DOD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 4 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
September 74
NASA 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
DOD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
The trade study presented here determines the cost to acquire
and support a Tug launch capability at WTR (maximum of 2 launches
per year), and compares this with the mission cost penalty incurred
if the WTR launch capability is not provided.
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The present mission scenario includes the following traffic from
WTR from CY 1984 through 1991:
1) Environmental Monitoring NN/D (EO-56); 4860 ib; orbit: 900
x 900 n mi at 103 deg inclination; 6 launches and 5 retrievals.
2) TIROS EO-6 (EO-12); 4740 lb; orbit; 900 x 900 n mi at 103
deg inclination; 1 launch and 1 retrieval.
3) Explorer - Upper Atmosphere PIIY-1B (AP-01); 2004 lb; orbit:
140 x 1900 n mi at 90 deg inclination; 2 launches and 2 re-
trievals.
This results in a WTR traffic rate of one or two launches per
year (Table 7-1) as compared to about 25 per year at ETR. EO-12
and EO-56 can be launched from ETR using kick stages; however,
they cannot be retrieved.
The WTR costs include the additional GSE, facilities, crew size,
fleet size, and transportation to acquire and support the current
identified traffic from WTR. The mission cost penalty (without
WTR) considers the added cost of kick stages and the difference
between refurbishment costs of retrieved spacecraft and the cost
of new spacecraft.
The study is based on data presented in References 1 and 2 to
the extent possible.
2.0 GROUND RULES AND ASSUMPTIONS
----------------------------------------------------------------
The following ground rules and assumptions are based primarily
on data presented in References 1 and 2:
1) A common Tug Processing Facility (TPF) is available at ETR
to support both ETR and WTR launches.
2) The Payload Preparation Room (PPR) and Payload Changeout
Room (PCR) are available for Tug use at WTR.
3) The ETR launch rate is one every two weeks. The maximum
launch rate at WTR is two per year.
4) WTR is assumed to be an alternative landing site for ETR
launches; therefore, the GSE to handle, safe, and transport
the Tug at WTR is required whether or not a WTR launch ca-
pability is provided.
5) Tug transportation between ETR and WTR will be by air.
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6) Schedules are based on 2 shifts per day, 5 days per week at
ETR, and 1 shift per day, 5 days per week at WTR.
7) Turnaround time from touchdown to liftoff is based on 160
working hours at ETR.
8) Kick stage costs are $0.93M for each launch.
9) Spacecraft costs are as follows (Reference 2):
New Refurbished
EO-12 $22M $6.OM
EO-56 $23M $5.7M
10) Spacecraft not retrieved (no WTR launch capability) are re-
placed with new spacecraft. Spacecraft retrieved (with WTR
launch capability) are refurbished.
3.0 SUMMlARY OF RESULTS
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The cost to acquire and support launch operations at WTR for 8
years (1984-1991) is approximately $14.6M of which $2.7M is non-
recurring and $11.9M is recurring. This breaks down as follows:
GSE $ 1.484M
Facilities 1.991
Crew 10.752
Transportation 0.352
$14.579M
If WTR launch capability is not provided, the cost penalty to
launch out of ETR is approximately $109M. This breaks down as
follows:
Kick Stages (7) $ 6.5M
Spacecraft Replacement
EO-12 (1) 16.0
EO-56 (5) 86.5
Total Cost Impact $109.0M
The spacecraft replacement costs are incurred by replacing the
spacecraft that would have been retrieved from WTR and refurbished
with new spacecraft.
The cost of acquiring and supporting a launch capability at WTR
($14.6M) is relatively small compared to the mission impact ($109.0M)
if this capability is not provided. In addition, the investment
cost ($2.7M) is a relatively small portion of the WTR cost impact
($14.6M).
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4.0 DISCUSSION
----------------------------------------------------
4.1 WTR OPERATIONS OVERVIEW
Figure 7-1 depicts overall operations at WTR involving the Orbiter
with its Tug payload after returning from a mission. The Orbiter
is moved from the landing strip to the Safing and Demating Facility
(SDF) where any residual propellants are removed from the Tug
and the tanks purged. The Orbiter with its Tug payload
is then moved to the Orbiter Maintenance and Checkout Facility
(OMCF) where the Tug is removed from the Orbiter cargo bay, safed,
and flown to the Tug Maintenance and Checkout Facility (TMCF) at ETR
for recycle. Since WTR is assumed to be an alternative landing
site for ETR launches, these facilities and GSE must be provided
whether or not a launch capability is provided at WTR.
Figure 7-2 presents an overview of the Shuttle launch facilities
at WTR. Payloads are prepared for launch in the Payload Prepara-
tion Room (PPR) and transported to the launch pad in the Payload
Changeout Room (PCR). The Mobile Service Tower (MST) provides
general access to the Shuttle on the launch mount and the Access
Tower provides access for final checkout and servicing through
umbilicals.
Figure 7-3 shows more specifically the Tug operations in the
launch area. The Tug is flown to WTR from the TMCF at ETR and
transported from the landing strip to the PRR airlock by prime
mover. The prime mover is removed and the Tug cleaned and moved
into the PPR. The Tug is moved to the vertical position and a
Systems Health Evaluation (SHE) test conducted. The spacecraft
is mated to the Tug, an integrated test performed, and the total
payload lifted into the PCR. The PCR is translated to the launch
pad where the Tug is installed in the Orbiter cargo bay. Propellants
and pressurants are loaded and final countdown commenced. These
operations will require additional Tug GSE (identical to that used
at ETR), facilities, and some Tug GSE peculiar to WTR.
4.2 COST IMPACT OF WTR LAUNCHES
4.2.1 GSE
The functional flow diagrams (Section III,A, Vol II, Final Report)
and the functional description sheets (Appendix A, Final Report)
were used to determine the additional GSE required for WTR. GSE
required for abort was excluded since WTR is assumed to be an
alternative landing site for ETR launches. (See 2.0 Assumptions
and Ground Rules.)
The additional GSE identified and cost estimates are shown in Table
7-2. Descriptions may be found in Appendix B, Final Report. Fig-
ure 7-4 shows the locations of the GSE in the Payload Preparation
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Hypergolic Service Facility
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Inspect, Service, Checkout Forward 
RCS
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Safing & Deservicing Facility 
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Runway Operations Remove Payload and AV Kit
Secure Orbiter Service Orbiter, Refurbish 
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Dump Mission Data Orbiter Systems Checkout
Figure 7-1 WTR Orbiter Processing
MST
PCR
L02
Area
Figure 7-2 Launch Pad (SLC-6)
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GSE List
Payload 0 A-009
Handling A-011
Unit A-012
( A-016
Elevator PCR 0 H-022
® H-030
SH-029
P-012
(D P-018
Access PCR
Tower
PPR
Payload Erection in PPR/PCR Payload Installation at Pad
Figure 7-3 Payload Erection and Installation
Table 7-2 GSE Requirements
Non-recurring Recurring
SA-009 Memory Load and Verify $120.0 K --
SA-011 Orbiter Cable Simulator 27.0 --
(A-012 Umbilical Simulator 36.0 --
T A-016 Ordnance Event Verification Cables 22.0 --
OH-022 Air Carry Tiedown Kit 21.0 --
SH-030 Vertical Adapter 42.5 + 40.0 --
Design
O H-029 Vertical Workstand 8.0 --
SP-012 APS Propellant Supply and Transfer Unit 44.5 --
SP-018 Vacuum Pump and Gauge - APS 34.5 --
WTR Activation & Engineering of GSE Integration 144.0 --
Documentation (GSE & Facilities) 144.0 --
System Maintenance (GSE & Facilities)(8 Yrs) -- 800.0
Total $ 684.0 K $ 800.0 K
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Room (PPR) at WTR. These are additional quantities of the same
GSE used at ETR with the exception of theH-029 Vertical Adapter
that is peculiar to WTR.
GSE List
0 A-009
A-011
() A-012
4 A-016
SH-022
Elevator H-030
H-029
P-012
S)P-018
Payload Rotation to Vertical &
Placement Into Mobile Changeout Unit
Figure 7-4 Location of GSE
4.2.2 Facilities
Additional facilities at WTR consist of those required for load-
ing and unloading of propellants and pressurants at the launch
pad. These services are obtained by tapping into the existing
Space Shuttle facilities at the valve farm and include the lines,
fittings, valves, umbilicals, connectors, and controls to route
propellants and pressurants between the Tug and the Space Shuttle
facilities. A fluid control and display console is also required
in the LCC with associate electronics, cabling, and sensing de-
vices.
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A LH2 F&D
LH2 Vent Burn
SL02 F&D
He F&D ,- -
F. C. - LH 
__2 . . I_- - ._ - .ET GH2 Vent
( F. C. - LO2  B Tower &
2 Swing Arm
MST
Setraction
Lau n c h
Mount -
Figure 7-5 Location of Facility Modifications - Plan View
1ZSLC- 6
MST
Facility List:
(A) -LH2 F&D
( -LH2 Vent
- LO2 F&D
.- , (- He F&D
( -F. C. 
- LH2
Launch (EF.C. - LO2
Mount
Figure 7-6 Location of Facility Modifications - Elevation View
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Table 7-3 lists the facility systems required at WTR for the Tug
and estimated costs. Locations are shown on Figures 7-5 and 7-6.
Costs are based on modifications to existing facilities rather
than design changes before construction start. Material costs
could vary considerably depending on the type of production used.
We assumed materials were obtained as add-on to Shuttle material
costs; however, allowances were made for differneces.
Table 7-3
Facility Requirements
) Liquid Hydrogen Fill and Drain System $ 86 K
) Liquid Hydrogen Vent System 62
® Liquid Oxygen Fill and Drain System 113
® Helium Fill and Drain System 29
SFuel Cell Servicing
Liquid Hydrogen 62
Liquid Oxygen 62
O Fluid Control and Display Console in LCC 337
I nstallation/Verification 240
Facility Design 1000
Total $1991 K
4.2.3 Crew Size
Estimates of crew size were based on supplementing the ETR crew
sufficiently to support WTR launch operations without impacting
ETR operations. The WTR launch operations crew would accompany
the Tug from ETR to WTR and!back. A small crew of supervisory
personnel would be permanently stationed at WTR to interface be-
tween the transient crew from ETR and WTR operations.
Figure 7-7 shows a timeline for ETR and WTR launch operations with
the manpower requirements for ETR and WTR superimposed. One launch
can be achieved every two weeks whether or not WTR is used. How-
ever, when a launch is required from WTR, simultaneous operations
occur on the ETR Tug and the WTR Tug. This increases the total
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manpower requirements as shown. Although the launch operations
and support personnel accompanying the Tug to WTR amount to 34,
the net increase in the ETR crew size is 21.* The skills required
and the resulting costs are as follows:
Permanent WTR Launch Site Operations Crew (7) $ 336 K/Year
WTR Tug Verification Manager
Secretary
Facility Support Supervisor
Test Engineering Supervisor
Quality Control Supervisor
Test Operations Supervisor
Safety Supervisor
Delta to ETR Crew to Support WTR Launches (21) $1,008 K/Year
GSE Engineer (1)
GSE Techs (2)
Avionics Engineers (2)
Propulsion Engineers (2)
Structures/Mechanical/Thermal Engineers (2)
Configuration Control Engineer (1)
Programmer/Software Engineer (1)
Inspectors (2)
Test Conductor (1)
Technicians (6)
Safety Engineer (1)
MIT W T F M WI T F M TW T FIM TIWIT F MITW T FM TW TIFMITIWIT F
ETR Launch - ETR Launch ---
TPF ETR) PC TPF (ETR) PCR Safe
I PF (ETR)I PCR (WTR)
TugISIC
Mate
To Accommodate WTR Launches
ETR Operations Delta Operations Manpower For Increases The ETR Crew Size
25- Crew Requirement WTR Launches By 21 Total (10-11 Per Shift)
Operations 20 (Task 1 Baseline)
Crew 15Tu
Per Shift 1 E
r WTR Tug
5- ETR Tug WTRCrew
25-
Support 20 ET Support Crew - Delta Support Crew
Per Shift 15 Requirement (Task 1 Baseline) For WTR Operationser i t -
5-
0
Figure 7-7 ETR and WTR Operations - Effect on Crew Size
*The ETR crew size increase to 21 persons is totally charged to WTR
even though the crew will be used at ETR for ETR support between
WTR launches.
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4.2.4 Fleet Size
It can be seen (Fig. 7-7) that the launch rate of one Tug every two
weeks can be accomplished with two Tugs whether or not WTR is
used. In reality, three would probably be required to allow for
contingencies; however, the use of WTR does not impact the fleet
size.
4.3 COST IMPACT WITHOUT W IR LAUNCH CAPABILITY
4.3.1 Mission Accomplishment
Spacecraft launched from WTR can also be launched from ETR; how-
ever, kick stages are required for EO-12 and EO-56. In addition,
EO-12 and EO-56 cannot be retrieved from ETR because of range
safety limitations (Ref 2). The spacecraft retrieved from WTR
can be refurbished, but they must be replaced with new spacecraft
if this capability is not provided.
Table 7-4 compares the mission accomplishment with and without WTR
launch capability. AP-10 is not affected in either case. EO-12
has one launch and one retrieval between 1984 and 1991 with WTR
capability. The retrieved spacecraft is refurbished. If launched
from ETR, one kick stage is required and the one spacecraft that
would have been retrieved from WTR is replaced with a new one.
Similarly, EO-56 has a total of six launches from WTR, and five
retrievals and refurbishments. If ETR is used, six kick stages
are required and the five spacecraft that would have been re-
trieved at WTR are replaced with new ones.
4.3.2 Delta Mission Costs
Using the cost data presented in Section 2.0, the cost of re-
furbishing the spacecraft retrieved from WTR is as follows:
Unit Cost Refurbish
Spacecraft to Refurbish, $M Quantity Cost, $M
EO-12 6.0 1 6.0
EO-56 5.7 5 28.5
Total 34.5
If WTR launch capability is not provided, the cost of the kick
stages required to launch out of ETR is as follows:
Unit Cost Kick Stage
Spacecraft Kick Stage, $M Quantity Cost, $M
EO-12 0.93 1 0.9
EO-56 0.93 6 5.6
Total 6.5
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7hUbce 7-4 Mistion Accomplishment.s
WTR
Delta
Baseline Relative To
WTR Payloads ID 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 Total ETR
Explorer D 1 1 2
Upper Atmosphere R A P 2 None
TIROS DEO-1 1 1 Refurbish
R 1 1 Spacecraft
Environmental D EO-56 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 Refurbish
Monitoring R 1 1 1 1 1 Spacecraft
Tug Flights 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 10 None
ETR
Delta
Baselined Relative To
WTR Payloads ID 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 Total WTR
Explorer D 1 1 2
AP-01 2 NoneUpper Atmosphere R 1 1 2 None
TIROS EO-12 1 1 Replace 1
R 0 Spacecraft,
Add 1 Kick
Stage
Environmental D EO-561 1 1 1 1 1 6 Replace 5Monitoring REO-56
Monitoring R 0 Spacecraft,
Add 6 Kick
Stage
Tug Flights 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 9 None
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The cost to replace the unretrievable spacecraft with new space-
craft is:
Unit Cost Replacement
Spacecraft to Replace, $M Quantity Cost, $M
EO-12 22 1 22
EO-56 23 5 115
Total 137
The delta mission costs include the cost of the kick stages plus
the difference between new spacecraft and refurbished spacecraft:
Delta Mission Cost = $6.5M + ($137M - $34.5M) = $109.0M
Therefore, the impact of no WTR launch capability on the mission
costs is approximately $109M.
4.4 COST COMPARISON
The cost to acquire and support WTR launch operations for 8 years
is approximately $14.6M as compared to $109.0M if this capability
is not provided. In addition, only $2.7M of the $14.6M is non-
recurring or "front-end" cost.
5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
--------------------------------------------------------------
1) The total cost to acquire and support WTR launch operations
($14.6M) is relatively small compared to the mission impact
($109M) if the capability is not provided.
2) The investment cost ($2.7M) is only a small portion of the
total WTR cost ($14.6M).
3) Tug launch capability, as defined herein, should be included
in the WTR baseline.
6.0 REFERENCES
----------------------------------------------------------------
1) First Data Exchange Package - Tug Fleet and Ground Operations
Schedules and Controls, September 1974 (Martin Marietta Cor-
poration).
2) IUS/Tug Payload Requirements Compatibility Study, First Prog-
ress Review and Data Exchange, NASA/MSFC Contract NAS8-31013
(McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Corporation).
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1.0 INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSIONS
------------------------------------------------------
The plans for task 3.0 and task 9.0 of this study require analy-
sis to indicate the sensitivity of (1) mission and traffic model
changes, (2) uneven launch centers, (3) Tug turnaround time, (4)
launch rate, etc. All of the sensitivity factors affect resource
requirements, such as GSE, facilities, manpower, and number of
Tugs. This analysis determines the sensitivity of the resource
requirements to the variation of the abovementioned factors to ful-
fill the requirements of tasks 3.0 and 9.0 of the study plan. As
an add-on a modular Tug concept sensitivity has been included.
The conclusions of this analysis follow:
1) The number of Tugs required is extremely sensitive to the
number of expendable flights and the number of flights per
expended Tug. To optimize the fleet size, the expendable
flights should be minimized and the flights per expended Tug
maximized.
2) The number of Tugs required is very sensitive to Tug life in
the 10- to 20-mission region and not very sensitive in the 20-
to 30-mission region, indicating that expenditures of time and
money to extend life beyond 20 missions is not warranted with
the present traffic model, primarily because of expendable
missions.
3) The number of Tugs required is generally insensitive to dedi-
cating Tugs as NASA or DOD.
4) Extending IUS beyond 1983, in general, will not reduce the
number of Tugs required, based on a given traffic model.
5) Reusable IUS life and quantity requirements are extremely
sensitive to the expendable flights and flights per expended
reusable IUS. To optimize quantity requirements and minimize
life requirements, the number of expendable flights should be
minimized and flights per expended reusable IUS maximized.
6) A 20-mission IUS is not warranted with the present mission
model, unless it costs little or no more than a 15-mission
IUS.
7) The number of reusable IUSs required is generally insensitive
to dedicated NASA or DOD use.
8) The WTR crew provision should be included in the manpower plan-
ning to accommodate high launch rates, uneven launch rates,
uneven mission durations and other contingencies, although
routinely the ETR crew provision is sufficient.
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9) NASA and DOD dedicated crews impose a high increase (30 to 50%)
in operations crews, and such dedication is not generally
recommended.
10) Because of the high number of expendable Tug flights, the
modularized Tug concept is probably not warranted.
11) Nominally one set of resources (men, facilities, GSE) will
satisfy the traffic model.
12) A basic program decision regarding expendability and reus-
ability of IUS needs to be made.
13) "Block" build of Tugs does not affect fleet size.
2.0 GUIDELINES, GROUND RULES AND ASSUMPTIONS
The guidelines, ground rules, and assumptions used in the sensi-
tivity analysis follow.
1) Traffic model baseline is presented in Table 8-1.
2) Tug life baseline is the requirement of MSFC for the 1973 Tug
systems studies of 20 flights per Tug.
3) Baseline ground turnaround time for Tug is 160 hours in ac-
cordance with the flow chart of subplan A.
4) NASA vs DOD traffic model is shown in Table 8-2.
5) The reusable IUS life baseline is 20 flights per IUS.
6) Number of expendable flights of reusable IUSs and Tugs is
shown in Table 8-3.
Table 8-1 Traffic Model, Number of Flights
Year
Configuration 1980* 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Total
Expendable IUS, No Transition 9 16 14 17 56
Expendable IUS, 1-yr Transition 9 16 14 17 7 63
Expendable IUS, Residual 9 16 14 17 7 4 3 1 1 2 1 1 76
Flights through 1991
Reusable IUS, No Transitiont 10 20 14 16 60
Reusable IUS, 1-yr Transitiont 10 20 14 16 8 68
IUS Reusable IUS, Residualt 10 20 14 16 8 5 4 2 2 2 2 2 87
Flights through 1991
Tug No Transition 19 22 24 18 18 16 26 22 165
Tug, with IUS Transition and 13 19 23 18 18 16 26 22 155
Tug Residuals
* 1980 Totals from Martin Marietta IUS Study Data (For SAMSO)
t Reusable IUS Totals from Martin Marietta Study Data (For SAMSO), 1984 through 1991 Data Derived
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Table 8-2 NASA vs DOD TraJ'fic Model
Year
Agency 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Total
Tug NASA 15 12 17 13 12 12 19 15 115
DOD 4 10 7 5 6 4 7 7 50
(1980-83)
NASA (42) 5 3 3 2 1 2 1 2 61
ReusableIUS* DOD (18) 3 2 1 1 1 26
*Extrapolated 
- 22/76 of All Reusable IUS Flights Are DOD in
1980 to 1983 per Martin Marietta IUS Study for SAMSO (1975)
Ilable 8-3 Reusable IUS and Tugj, Number of Expendable Flights
Year
Vehicle 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 Total
Reusable IUS 2 7 2 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 22
Tug 4 2 1 1 8
IUS Stopf IUS Stop
for No for 1-yr
Transition Transition
Tug Data - MDAC, No. MDC G 5452, September 1974
IUS Data - 1980-1983, Martin Marietta for SAIISO Study for Storable IUS
1984-1991, Martin Marietta Derived, 25% of All Flights are
Expended
3.0 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
-----------------------------------------------------------
3.1 TOTAL TUG REQUIREMENTS
1) The baseline requirements vary between a total of 13 and 16
Tugs. The final number is dependent on number of flights per
expended Tug.
2) Requirements are insensitive to build/delivery rate as long
as active fleet size and inventory requirements are met.
3) Tug requirements are very sensitive to:
a) Total number of Tug flights
b) Total number of expendable Tug flights
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c) Total number of flights by each expended Tug
d) Maximum flights per Tug
4) Tug requirements are not too sensitive to IUS transition and
continued use, varying only by one over the probable zone of
flights per expended Tug (Fig. 8-8).
5) Tug requirements are generally not sensitive to dedicated NASA
and DOD use, varying only by a maximum of one over the probable
zone of flights per expended Tug (Fig. 8-7).
3.2 ACTIVE FLEET SIZE REQUIREMENTS 
- TUG
1) Two active Tugs are required generally, based on launch rate.
2) Dedicated Tugs (NASA and DOD) would increase the active fleet
size to three.
3) Downstream refinement of the launch schedule may impose ad-
ditional requirements on the active fleet (high launch rate
per month greater than monthly average of annual launch rate).
4) Expending Tugs increases the active fleet size to a minimum
annual inventory of four in 1984, six in 1985, four in 1990,
and three in 1991.
3.3 TOTAL IUS REQUIREMENTS
1) Expendable requirements vary from 56 to 76 and reusable require-
ments from 15 to 27, depending on transition with Tug.
2) A 20-flight life IUS is probably not warranted and a 5-flight
life IUS may be sufficient (with four flights per expended
reusable IUS).
3) IUS requirements are generally not sensitive to NASA and DOD
dedication.
3.4 ACTIVE FLEET SIZE REQUIREMENTS (REUSABLE IUS)
Active fleet size requirements (reusable IUS) are depicted inTable 8-4.
3.5 MANPOWER SENSITIVITY SUMMARY
1) Manpower sensitivity to traffic model launch rate 
- none.
2) 'anpower sensitivity to ITR launches 
- increase operations
crew requirement by about 30%.
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Table 8-4 Reusable IUS Annual Inventory Requirements
Year
Item 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91
Launch Rate IUSs 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Expended IUSs 2 7 2 3 2 2 1 1 1 1
*DOD Dedicated IUS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
*Total Annual 4 10 4 5 4 4 3 2 2 2 2 2
Inventory
*Subtract One from Total If IUSs Not Dedicated
3) Sensitivity to uneven launch centers and mission duration -
none.
4) Sensitivity to work day/week - occasional day/week overtime
to accommodate uneven launch centers or missions.
5) Sensitivity to NASA and DOD dedicated crews - increase
operational crew requirements by approximately 50%.
3.6 FACILITY SENSITIVITY
Two each launch pads and TPF test cells are required to satisfy
short-term launch rates.
3.7 GSE SENSITIVITY
GSE requirements are not generally sensitive to short-term launch
rate. There are five exceptions, out of 70 items, requiring extra
quantities because of high use rate.
3.8 MODULAR TUG CONCEPT
Because of the high number of expendable Tug flights in the pro-
gram, the modular Tug concept is not particularly attractive.
4.0 DISCUSSION
4.1 TOTAL TUG REQUIREMENTS
The total number of Tugs required is determined by the formula of
Figure 8-1. As can be seen from that formula the number of Tugs
is sensitive to several factors: total number of flights, number
of expendable flights, number of flights by Tugs being expended,
maximum number of flights per Tug before it is "worn out", and
unreliability losses. Figures 8-2, 8-3, and 8-4 depict the vari-
ation in Tug requirements as the formula factors vary.
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Total Number of Total Number of Flights
Total Tugs Total Number of + All Tug Flights by Tugs Being Expended + Unreliability
Required Expendable Flights Maximum Number of Flights per Tug Losses
8 + [165 - (Varies from 56 to 105) 1 per 100 Flights
Baseline of 20 (2 Total)
= 8 + 3 + 2 To 8 + 6 + 2
Baseline
Total Tugs = 13 to 16 Depending on Expendable Flight Schedule
Required
Figure 8-1 Total Number of Tugs Required - Entire Program
14 Expendable Tug Flights
24
22
12
Probable Zone20 Pob Based on Maximum of
20 Flights per Tug
and 165 Total Flights
18 8
8
16
4 12
O4
10
5 10 15 20
Number of Flights of Expendable Tugs Only, per Tug
Figure 8-2 Sensitivity to Number of Expendable Flights and
Flights/Expendable Tug
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27
10 Flights Max/Tug
24 
---- Probable Zone
21- / // Based on 8 Expendable Tug
0 /Flights and 165 Flights Total
420 .. 15 Flights
1
25 //,, / //
S/ ' / // ' I I I I
5 l 20 25 30
205 Total Flights Based on Maximum 6f-
S20 Flights/Tug and
N o i8 Expendable Tug
1 Flights
S16 Il
185
/ /
5 0 15 20 2165 (Baseline)
Number of Flights of Expendable Tugs Only, per Tug
Figure 8-3 Sensitivity to Flights/Tug and Flights/Expendable Tug
19
20 Flights/Tug and145
b8 8 Expendable Tug
c-
0 125
11
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Figure 8-2 indicates that the number of Tugs required is sensi-
tive to the number of expendable Tug flights (from 11 to 24 as
the number of expendable flights goes from 2 to 14). Even in the
probable zone of seven to 14 flights per Tug before it is expended,
the total number of Tugs varies from 11 to 20. Therefore, to optimize
the total number of Tugs required, (1) minimize the number of expend-
able Tug flights, (2) maximize the number of flights each Tug gets
before it is expended.
Figure 8-3 indicates the sensitivity of the number of Tugs re-
quired to the maximum number of flights per Tug using the base-
line traffic model. The figure depicts large sensitivity between
10 and 20 flights maximum per Tug, and less sensitivity between
20 and 30. For example, in the probable zone of flights per ex-
pended Tug, the number of Tugs required increases by five in the
20 to 10 flights maximum per Tug region, and the number of Tugs
required only decreases by two maximum (usually one) in going
from 20 to 30 maximum flights per Tug. Therefore, with the present
traffic model, the 20-flight maximum per Tug from the MSFC studies
of 1973 appears to be optimum from point of view of the number of
Tugs required.
Figure 8-4 indicates the sensitivity of the Tug requirements to
increases and decreases in the total number of Tug flights, indi-
cating a sensitivity of one Tug for every 20-flight change, which
is what would be expected with 20 flights maximum per Tug.
If the traffic model increases significantly, more than 20
flights maximum per Tug may be warranted to keep the Tug require-
ments down. Reduction of the number of flights in the model
does not warrant an increase in the maximum number of flights,
unless the number of expendable flights is reduced. To ascertain
the merit of providing a longer life Tug would require a separate
tradeoff study.
Tug requirements are insensitive to build rate and delivery rate
as long as active fleet size and expend requirements are met.
Figures 8-5 and 8-6 both show the same number of Tugs required
overall. This insensitivity allows for program flexibility to
use a "block" concept over the Tug operational span without af-
fecting the total number of Tugs in the fleet.
The sensitivity to dedicated DOD and NASA Tugs has been analyzed.
Figure 8-7 depicts the sensitivity of dedicating vs nondedicating;
the general observation is that the number of Tugs required is not
very sensitive to dedication.
Finally, the Tug requirements are sensitive to the IUS transition
as depicted by Figure 8-8 but generally only dependent on the number
of flights per expended Tug. Given a low number of flights per ex-
pended Tug (7) will require one less Tug (16 vs 15); given a high
number of flights per expended Tug (14) will result in no reduction
in number of Tugs, IUS transition notwithstanding.
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Flights
Tug No. 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 per Tug
1 1 1 2 1 2 7
2 1 2 1 1 2 7
3 11 12 2 7
4 1111 2 6
5 1 2 2 2 3 10
6 2 221 3 10
7 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 111 1 1 1 1 1 19(20)
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 20
9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 20(18)
10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 19(20)
11 1 1 11 1 111 11 2 1 2 1 11 1 1 1120
12 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 22 1 1 1 1 120
Total Flights 19 22 24 18 18 16 26 22 165
TuTug No.3 1 Lost Tug Requirements Are Not
TDependent on Build Rate
as Long as Active Fleet Size
Total Tugs =14 Requirements Are Met
Figure 8-5 Early Build and Delivery
Tug Flights/
No. 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Tug
1 1112 12 7
2 1 211 2 7
3 1 1 1 2 2 7
4 1 1112 6
5 12 2 2 3 10
6 22213 10
7 3 332232 2 20
8 3 3 3 312 2 2 2 20
9 2 2 1 2 212 2 2 3 18
10 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 11111 1 1 20
11 1 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 20
12 1 33 3 3 2 2 20
Total 19 22 24 18 18 16 26 22 165
Flights
Tug No. 13 L Tug Requirements Are Not
Tug No. 14 Lost Dependent on Build Rate as
Long as Active Fleet Size
Total Tugs = 14 Requirements Are Met
Figure 8-6 SLOW Build and Delivery for Block Concept
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16 \ \ Non Dedicated Tug
\ - DOD and NASA
Dedicated Tugs
S15-
\0 \Baseline - 165 Tug Flights
S \ 50 DOD
_ _" .115 NASA
14 8 Expendable
\ - Max 20 Flights
per Tug
z
4J 13
V1 Indicates Tug
Sensitivity to
Dedication
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Total Number of Flights of
Expendable Tugs Only, per Tug
Figure 8-7 Sensitivity to NASA and DOD Dedicated Tugs
J/ - - = No IUS Transition
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4.2 ACTIVE FLEET SIZE REQUIREMENTS(TUG)
The Tug active fleet size is sensitive to three factors: (1) the
annual launch rate (for long term determination - 1 year), (2)
working days between Tug launch centers (for short term determina-
tion - few weeks to few months), and (3) the time it takes to
process a Tug from landing through liftoff, i.e., ground turnaround
time. Figure 8-9 shows the sensitivity of the active fleet size to
these three factors. The probable zone on the figure indicates a
need for two Tugs in the active fleet; however, short-term demands
in the launch rate could increase the requirement to four. A sizable
increase in the ground turnaround time can be tolerated without
increasing the active fleet size (160 to 240 hours), based on the
annual launch rate. The converse is also true.
The active fleet size is sensitive to the expendable rate such
that in a given year the number of Tugs required (inventory) is
the active fleet required to meet the launch rate plus those that
will be expended (Fig. 8-5 and 8-6 give the annual inventory re-
quirement).
If Tugs were to be dedicated as NASA or DOD Tugs,, the active fleet
size requirement would be increased by one as indicated by Figure
8-10, based on the NASA and DOD launch rates indicated in Table
8-2.
4.3 TOTAL IUS REQUIREMENTS
The total number of IUSs required is dependent on a major program
decision to provide expendable or reusable IUSs. If the decision
is made to go expendable, the total IUS requirement is equal to
the number of IUS flights (Ref Table 8-1). If the decision is
made to go reusable, then the same general formula as used for Tug
(Fig. 8-1) will be used to determine IUS quantity requirements.
The number or reusable IUSs is further dependent on the IUS to Tug
transition, and the requirements indicated reflect that dependence.
4.3.1 Total Reusable IUS Requirements, No Transition with Tug
(1980-1983)
Figure 8-11 depicts the sensitivity of the reusable IUS require-
ments to the expendable flight schedule and indicates a total
requirement of 15 to 18 IUSs.
4.3.2 Total Reusable IUS Requirements, One Year Transition with
Tug (1980-1984)
Figure 8-11 depicts this sensitivity, and indicates a total re-
quirement of 17 to 20 IUSs.
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Total Number Unreliability
Total Reusable Total Number of [of IUS Flights - Total Number of Flights Losses
IUSs Required Expendable IUS Flights N by IUSs Being Expended (1 per 100 Flights)
Maximum Number of Flights per IUS
For 1980-1983, Total= 14 + [60 - (Varies from 14 to 60) + 1 = 15 to 18
LFor 1980-1983,Total = 14 Baseline of 20 J
For8 - (Varies from 16 to 68) + 1 7 to 20
For 1980-1984, Total = 16 + Baseline of 20 + 1 = 7 to
(1-yr Transition)
For 1980-1991, Total = 22 + [87 - (Varies from 22 to 87) + 1 -= 23 to 27
(Residual IUS
throughout Program)
In all cases, higher total number represents one flight per expended reusable IUS,
and lower number represents maximum flights per expended reusable IUS.
Figure 8-11 Total Number of Reusable IUSs Required
4.3.3 Total Reusable IUS Requirements, Residual IUS Use (1980 -
1991)
Figure 8-11 depicts the requirement of 23 to 27 IUSs.
4.3.4 Sensitivity
Like the Tug, the IUS requirements are sensitive to total number
of flights, number.of expendable flights, number of flights per
expended reusable IUS, maximum number of flights before the IUS
is "worn out", and unreliability losses. Figures 8-12 through
8-14 depict this sensitivity. The IUS is sensitive to the number
of expendable flights with the number varying up or down approxi-
mately one as the expendable flights vary up or down by one. Fig-
ure 8-13 shows that with the present traffic model there is very
little sensitivity between a 15-flight and 20-flight life IUS in-
dicating that much expenditure for a 20-flight life reusable IUS
may not be warranted. The figure depicts that a 5-flight life
may be sufficient if each expended reusable IUS can get at least
four flights. In all cases, the number of IUSs is very sensitive
to the number of flights per expended IUS leading to the same IUS
conclusion that was reached for Tug: To optimize total IUS require-
ments, maximize flights per expended IUS and minimize number of ex-
pendable flights.
Figure 8-14 indicates the sensitivity of IUS requirements to total
number of flights. Comparing Figure 8-14 to Figure 8-4, it is
noted that there are as many Tugs required for 155 total flights as
for 165, and to increase reusable IUS flights from 60 (no transition)
to 87 (residual IUS flights through 1991) increases the reusable IUS
fleet size by a minimum of seven indicating that residual IUS flights
through 1991 with the present traffic model (Tables 8-1 and 8-3) is
not warranted. Note a further traffic model tradeoff is required to
optimize the flights for IUS and Tug to ensure that the increase in
IUS flights and decrease in Tug flights relationship is optimum.
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Reusable IUS Requirements, Sensitivity to Total Number of FZights
A final sensitivity ha.s been studied, dedicated NASA and DOD re-
usable IUSs. Using the formula of Figure 8-11 for NASA and DOD
flights (Ref 8-2) will result in a curve in Figure 8-15 showing
that the quantity of IUSs is generally insensitive to dedicated
use.
4.4 ACTIVE REUSABLE IUS REQUIREMENTS
The active fleet size reusable IUS requirements, like the Tug, are
sensitive to turnaround time, annual launch rate and working days
between launch centers. Figure 8-9 depicts IUS sensitivity as
well as Tug sensitivity, indicating a probable need of only one
active IUS based on launch rate (two in 1981). Again, the reusable
IUS annual inventory is a function of the expending rate, so if
one is added to each reusable IUS quantity shown in Table 8-3, the
result is the annual inventory requirement. NASA and DOD dedicated
reusable IUSs would increase this number by one more; Table 8-4
gives this result.
4.5 MANPOWER SENSITIVITY
In general support personnel requirements are not affected by launch
rate, uneven launch centers, mission duration, WTR requirements, etc,
but operations personnel are. Therefore, each of these factors has
been studied to determine the sensitivity of operations personnel
requirements.
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4.5.1 ETR Operations - Maximum Launch Rate - Even Launch Centers -
Even Mission Duration
This condition establishes a baseline beyond the single-cycle
crew requirements. Figure 8-16 depicts the total operations crew
requirements based on the stick-and-ball chart of subplan A to
this report. It does show that generally the single-cycle crew
requirement will suffice. (The five man over peaks requirement
can be eliminated with overtime and spreading the safing cycle
over a longer time frame.)
4.5.2 ETR/WTR Operations - Maximum Launch Rate - Even Launch
Centers - Even Mission Duration
Figures 8-17 and 8-18 present total operations personnel require-
ments for ETR and WTR operations. Both figures, one for a one-
shift operation and the other for two shifts, indicate a peak
requirement of about 62 to 65 people. These numbers have been
taken from the ETR stick-and-ball chart of subplan A and the WTR
stick and ball chart of subplan B of this report.
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4.5.3 Uneven Launch Centers
The maximum Tug annual launch rate (26) indicates bi-weekly launch
centers on the average; however, over a shorter period launch
centers may be closer together. Physical limitations to the
facility (two launch pads, with a 5-day refurbish cycle per pad)
limit launch centers to a 5-day minimum. The sensitivity of the
operations crew size to these uneven launch centers is depicted
in Figures 8-19 and 8-20 to indicate the ETR-only crew sensitivity
and the ETR/WTR crew sensitivity. These figures show that the
ETR/WTR crew can routinely handle uneven launch centers to five
days. Figure 8-19 indicates the ability of the basic ETR crew to
handle uneven launch centers to five days by going to a seven-day
work week with two 12-hour shifts per day (with shift biasing and
processing schedule adjustment to eliminate three one-shift-only
peaks).
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4.5.4 Uneven Mission Durations
Tug mission durations may vary from one day to seven days imposing
a time variable on the safing function after landing. Figure 8-21
shows this variation imposed on the manpower required to process
the next Tug (for planning purposes using even launch centers,
bi-weekly launches). The ETR/WTR crew can adequately handle all
mission durations. The ETR crew can routinely handle all but
two, and those can be handled in several ways: (1) overtime,
(2) schedule adjustment, (3) time sharing of skills on two Tugs
during safing, etc. Therefore: uneven mission durations do not
affect crew size.
4.5.5 NASA and DOD Dedicated Crews
If DOD provides dedicated crews for DOD launches, Figure 8-22
depicts the crew requirements. Dedication increases operational
crew requirements by about 50%.
4.6 FACILITY SENSITIVITY
Two basic facilities, the launch pad and the TPF test cell, are
sensitive to the time span between launch centers in terms of num-
bers required. Figures 8-23 and 8-24 show this sensitivity. Both
figures indicate a probable minimum requirement of one (launch pad
and test cell); however, both are marginal in the minimum span of
five days between centers indicating two each should be provided.
4.7 GSE SENSITIVITY
GSE requirements are also sensitive to the working days between
launch centers and the short-term launch rate. Figure 8-25 depicts
sensitivity in terms of percentage of use in time per processing
cycle. The figure indicates that, for the most part, the short-
term and long-term launch rate can be met with one set of GSE.
Only five of the 70 items identified in Appendix B, need to be
provided in extra quantities.
4.8 MODULAR TUG CONCEPT - SENSITIVITY OF AVIONICS MODULES
Given a modular Tug consisting of separable avionics and a pro-
pulsion module, the number of avionics modules can vary as a func-
tion of mission life such that fewer avionics modules may be re-
quired than would otherwise be required in a nonmodular Tug. Fig-
ure 8-26 indicates this sensitivity. Because of the high number
of expendable flights, the reduction in modules as mission life
goes up is not as attractive as was expected.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
-----------------------------------------------------
The IUS/Tug orientation (vertical or horizontal) is of prime in-
terest and concern to the ground operations analysis. Orienta-
tion affects the facility requirements, GSE requirements, and
transportation and handling equipment requirements. Recommended
orientation for processing after consideration of these require-
ments, as well as spacecraft requirements, is presented in this
addendum. Spacecraft requirements will be limited to those that
affect Tug during and after mating.
This assessment considers Tug requirements for processing and site-
to-site transportation requirements.
2.0 GROUND RULES
-------------------------------------------------------------------
All elements were analyzed to determine the effect of orientation;
only ground operations flow, facilities/GSE, and transportation
support equipment were considered to be significantly affected.
In addition to the study elements, the effect of spacecraft re-
quirements during and after mating to the Tug, must be considered.
3.0 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
-----------------------------------------------------------------
After analyzing the considerations it is recommended that the IUS
and Tug be processed in the vertical position and transported in
the horizontal position. However, at this time, it appears that
the spacecraft requires vertical transport to the launch pad. This
requirement would entail expensive and complicated transportation
and handling equipment. As the Tug has no requirement for vertical
transport, costs attendant on the vertical transport requirement
should not be absorbed by the Tug program.
Some key functions reacting to spacecraft preferences/requirements
are (1) Tug-to-spacecraft mate vertically, (2) integrated check-
out after mate vertically, and (3) payload-to-Orbiter mate in the
vertical orientation.
The IUS would prefer vertical processing because of existing GSE
and procedures, while GSE supporting Tug processing has not yet
been designed; therefore, orientation has little impact.
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4.0 DISCUSSION
----------------------------- 
--- . ..-------------- 
.
Table 9-1 summarizes the preference of the IUS, Tug, and Tug/
spacecraft for various phases of the Tug program. A pref-
erence for vertical processing, spacecraft mate and checkout,
and vertical transport to launch pad is shown in the table.
Also indicated is an IUS/Tug-only preference for horizontal
transport.
Table 9-1 Vertical vs Horizontal Considerations
Element GSE TSE Facility Operation Crew
Program Tug- Tug- Tug- Tug-
Phase IUS Tug S/C IUS Tug S/C IUS Tug S/C IUS Tug S/C
Processing (Tug V -- -- V -- -- V V V V V V
or IUS only)
Spacecraft Mate V -- V V V V V V V V V Vand Checkout
Transport to 
-- -- -- H H V -- -- -- H H HLaunch Pad
Transport ETR to -- -- -- II H -- -- -- -- H H HWTR
Transport from 
-- -- -- II H -- -- -- -- H H HManufacturing
V = Vertical Preference
H = Horizontal Preference
-- = Not Applicable or No Preference
4.1 IUS/TUG-ONLY PROCESSING
Tug-only processing does not require either horizontal or verticalpositioning. Access would be easier in the horizontal, while some
maintenance items could be accomplished more efficiently in ver-
tical orientation. IUS/Tug manufacturing, transport, and landing
is in the horizontal position; launch is in the vertical. Tug
project prefers all transportation, i.e., contractor to launch
site, TPF to launch pad, in the horizontal orientation.
While Tug has no preference for processing in the horizontal or
vertical orientation, the IUS does. The IUS prefers vertical
processing because of existing GSE and present processing pro-
cedures. The IUS, like the Tug, also prefers all transportationin the horizontal.
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4.2 SPACECRAFT CONSIDERATIONS
A review of SSPD data reveals that at this time there is insuf-
ficient data to determine Shuttle era post-Tug mating handling
requirements. In lieu of Shuttle era spacecraft data, a survey
was made of existing spacecraft mating preferences. Table 9-2
shows the results of that survey. It can be seen that all space-
craft currently flying and all other spacecraft considered prefer
mating in the vertical position. In addition to the preferences,
there were four spacecraft that required vertical mating. These
requirements are as follows: (1) bubble entrapment in the hydra-
zine system (no bladder expulsion); (2) "fines" from the catalyst
bed migrating out to thrusters if handled horizontally; (3) a
sun shade that cannot be handled horizontally because it cannot
support itself in a l-g environment; and (4) a long cylindrical
solar array on long booms that cannot be handled horizontally.
This survey was based on some customizing of existing spacecraft
to fly on Tug. None of these conditions changed the requirements
for vertical handling. With considerable redesign, the above
problems might be solved.
4.3 OPERATIONS CREW
Crew size is not affected by orientation of the vehicle. The
operations to be accomplished are the same in either orientation,
and with proper design, access will not be a problem.
At present and in the past, all launch site processing crew
experience has been to process in the vertical orientation. As
the IUS prefers vertical processing, the crew transition from IUS
to Tug requires less training if both the IUS and Tug were proc-
essed in the same orientation.
4.4 GSE/FACILITIES
The IUS prefers vertical processing because of existing GSE and
processing procedures. Because the Tug GSE has not been designed,
orientation would cause minimal impact on the Tug GSE. One area
that would be affected would be spacecraft mate with Tug. This
mating would be less complicated if accomplished in the vertical,
and would require less complicated GSE, particularly alignment
equipment. Vertical processing would require the SAEF-1 airlock
to be modified by raising the roof, and a manipulator would be
required to insert the Tug/spacecraft into the payload canister.
Subplan D recommends activating the VAB low bay. Orientation has
minimal effect on the VAB low bay, and the recommended approach of
handling the vertical payload would not require a manipulator for
loading. Horizontal processing would require more floor space
compared to vertical processing.
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Table 9-2 Vertical vs Horizontal Processing 
- Spacecraft to Tug Mating
Current Preferred Mandatory
Mating Mating Mating
Currently Operations Operations Operations
Spacecraft Flying IIoriz Vert. Ioriz Vert Horiz Vert
1 ATS X X X X
2 CSC X X X
3 SEOS X
4 ATS-EXP X
5 CSC-EXP X
6 SEOS-EXP X
7 AGOES X
8 SMS X X X
9 MJS X X X
10 DSCS X X X X
11 FSC X X X
12 DSP X X X X
13 DSCS-S X
14 DSP-S X X
Considerations:
1. All currently flying spacecraft are mated to carrier in
vertical position.
2. All spacecraft surveyed prefer mating in vertical position.
3. At least four of the spacecraft surveyed require mating in
vertical position.
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4.5 TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
Spacecraft mate at the TPF drives the decision for vertical inte-
gration, checkout, and transfer from TPF to PCR. Before spacecraft
integration, there is no requirement for vertical orientation of
IUS, Tug, or kick stage, although IUS prefers vertical orientation
based on existing GSE and its support documentation. Manufactur-
ing operations, air transport, ground movement, and handling to
the point of integration favors horizontal orientation. IUS, Tug and
kick stage favor horizontal orientation throughout the handling
process. The TPF vertical pivoting operation and need for a
pivoting adapter can be avoided. Crane operation can handle intra-
TPF moves and transporter on/off loadings without the requirement
for a manipulation device. Tug design is not affected by manip-
ulation pad loadings. Horizontal positioning facilitates access
for payload to canister loading and internal attachment. A
canister cover can best be accessed, removed, handled, and in-
stalled in the horizontal position. Canister and canister trans-
porter design and development costs are reduced if vertical tip-
over control for wind and accelerations and horizontal to vertical
erection/stabilization are not required. Ramp slope to attain PCR
loading postion on pad is a problem for vertical transport.
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